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ABSTRACT

Based on papers presented at the East-West Communication Institute conferences and seminars in Hawaii between 1973 and 1975, these five essays focus on intercultural communication, emphasizing that popular culture existed with great diversity for centuries before modern media and that popular cultures have importance and impact on the everyday life of the common people in all cultures. The essays discuss the effects of global communication, particularly through radio and television, on the popular cultures of developing countries; the factors involved in popular culture research that distinguish it from communication research; an illustrated analysis of a revolutionary Japanese comic strip; the role of stimulants (tea, coffee, and tobacco) in effecting self-change and their use in the communication process of various cultures; and the place of stereotypical images in intercultural communication. (HAI)

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ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE POPULAR CULTURE

Coffee, Comics, and Communication

by

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December 1975

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ABSTRACT

Five essays based on papers presented at East-West Communication Institute conferences and seminars from 1973-1975.

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PREFACE

The essays selected for this volume were presented to various conferences and seminars held at the East-West Communication Institute between 1973-1975. Though the themes and content of the essays are varied, I chose them in order to emphasize two things: (1) that popular culture existed for centuries--long before the arrival of newer, sophisticated media--with amazing diversity from culture to culture; and that (2) popular culture has had a great importance and impact on the everyday life of common people in all cultures.

I am most grateful to those colleagues who joined the conferences for they represented many cultures of Asia and the Pacific. It was the wisdom of those people which urged me to write these essays.

ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE POPULAR CULTURE

Coffee, Comics, and Communication

GLOBAL INSTANTANEOUSNESS AND INSTANT GLOBALISM
--some observations on the significance of
popular culture in developing countries--

This is the age of coating. Medical tablets are sugarcoated; book covers, wallpaper, and other durable paper products are plastic-coated; optical lenses are silicone-coated; many of the things around us--furniture, automobiles, and appliances--are paint-coated. Even the planet on which we live is coated! The earth at the start of the last quarter of the twentieth century took on a unique coating of its own--an "electronic coating." The earth's surface is now covered by innumerable, though invisible, electronic waves. To ascertain the existence of such waves just turn on the switch of a transistor radio. You will hear sounds originating from many parts of the world, twenty-four hours a day, without intermission.

Radio waves are active all the time, covering the earth, and the transistor radio could be viewed as a Geiger counter for such radio activity.

The electronic coating began when Marconi succeeded in his trans-Atlantic wireless communication in 1901; the invention of the vacuum tube followed, and then came the inauguration of broadcasting in 1920 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In the initial stages, the coating was local, covering only a small geographical segment; as the number of broadcasting stations increased, a wider coating, the "network" evolved, first in the United States. By the early 1930s, most of the countries in Europe and Japan had begun to have national radio broadcasting coverage. The coating had reached a national level, and the same coverage was achieved in most of the "developing" countries as well by the end of the 1950s. With the invention of the transistor, millions of people today own their own receivers. The electronic coating, however, was found to have a unique characteristic, in contrast to the older media of communication, such as the press, with its circulation primarily limited to national boundaries. If the power is strong enough, the territory which a single broadcasting station can "coat" can be expanded to such a considerable degree that the people in nearby countries can listen to the programs. The messages go beyond the national borders. Moreover, if a relay system is mobilized, a program originating at a particular spot on the earth can be broadcast around the world instantaneously. Global broadcasting was experimented with as early as 1932, when the tenth Olympic Games were held in Los Angeles. Though the area covered by international broadcasting of the 1930s was limited, for the first time in history, millions of people in different parts of the world were hearing one message simultaneously. In particular, the combination of television and communication satellites made the reception of clear audiovisual messages possible in many areas. With the initiative of BBC in the summer of 1967, the first global television broadcasting was conducted with great success; needless to say, we are already used to watching programs from various parts of the world via satellite. Incidents in Tokyo are seen in New York instantaneously and vice versa. Events in Saigon were watched by millions of families in Europe and vice versa. And with the introduction of jet transportation, we are often inclined to think that the world is indeed small. The sense of distance, both psychological and physical, is now becoming weaker, if not disappearing. John McHale suggests that as a result of global networks of communication and transportation, "global shrinkage" has been taking place. Global instantaneousness, generally speaking, has advantages in the sense that the human population on the planet can be informed of major happenings of the world without delay. Global communication technology also has great potential for better understanding among peoples.

However, certain aspects of global communication are problematic; among other things, in the field of popular culture, the emergence of a "world popular culture" has negative effects as well as positive ones, especially for developing countries.

One of the striking effects of global communication in developing countries is that the popular culture materials to which the people of these countries are exposed are <u>too "equal" to</u> those which entertain the peoples of more developed societies. Take, for example, television programs. As a recent UNESCO survey pointed out, most of the television stations in developing countries in Asia, Africa, and South America broadcast, to a considerable degree, programs produced in more developed countries. In an extreme case, in Guatemala imported programs occupy 84 percent of the total broadcasting time; in Zambia, the figure is 64 percent; in Malaysia, 71 percent; in Singapore, 78 percent; and in Hong Kong, 40 percent. The people of these countries are now watching programs for which the original target audience was the urban middle-class families of the more developed countries, especially the United States and Japan. On the screen, regardless of the type of program, middle-class values are presented--the actors are surrounded by durable commodities, material conveniences, and many aspects of the "affluent society." Though there has not been any systematic research on the matter so far, the impact of programs produced in more industrial societies upon the minds of the people of developing countries must be profound.

The contents of American and Japanese programs are, generally speaking, consumer oriented, and it is not presumptuous to infer that the viewers in developing countries are influenced by this consumer philosophy.

Indeed, one of my friends in the Philippines reports that the children there are extremely fond of TV commercials. The danger is that the people of developing countries, not only children but also adults, may acquire more of a sense of consumership than producership. In the process of development, consumption must accompany production. However, in certain developing countries interest in consumption comes before interest in production. Does this trend suggest any possibility of a newer type of "development"? We do not know the answer yet. One optimistic interpretation may be that the interest in consumption can stimulate an interest in production (a "We-want-a-refrigerator, let's-make-one" philosophy). Because the developed countries of the world are now suffering from over-production of most industrial products, the importation of these products by less developed nations would be a more likely solution than the expansion of industrialization. One compromise would be for more developed countries to subsidize production in less developed countries where labor is less expensive, and to export the products to profitable markets. According to the classic formula of development, the first stage is the accumulation of capital followed by industrial production. After a few centuries, there comes the age of consumption. It seems that the developing countries today do not fit into this scheme. Instead, a consumer culture is approaching maturity while substantial production is still lacking.

There is an irony in this trend, because the broadcasting system itself often has been a part of "foreign aid" programs that aimed at the promotion of development.

In a broader context, there seems to be a contradiction between evenness in the flow of information and the unevenness of material wealth. Exposure to information, or popular culture materials in the context of this paper, is evenly distributed. The peoples of the world, regardless of area, are exposed to the same values as transmitted by TV, radio, and movies; yet the economic conditions of nations vary from the extremely rich to the extremely poor. Isn't it a tragedy to see a people watching the theme of affluence on a TV screen while all around them people are starving to death?

The area of popular culture presents us with a different kind of potential tragedy: With the diffusion of popular culture through mass media in developing countries, even their sense of national identity becomes endangered. In a recent study conducted in Thailand, it was discovered that the popular heroes are mostly Japanese TV stars, rather than "local" figures. The children and teenagers of the country can name the foreign stars with whom they are familiar through daily exposure on the TV screen, but because of the relative lack of programs produced in Thai, they do not see or hear about their "national" popular heroes. (Some of their names do appear in school textbooks.) The sense of nationalism is, as many scholars have pointed out, essential for the social and economic future of developing countries. But what has been happening in the past several years discourages nationalism on the popular level. At the least, "foreign" popular culture does not serve to promote national identity and nationalism.

It is easy for us to talk about the "age of world popular culture," an age in which the Beatles, Elvis Presley, James Bond, and many other popular heroes are universal heroes, liked and appreciated by millions of people across national boundaries, and this observation may be quite correct. However, the implication of the existence of these "universal" heroes is that there may be a danger of "instant globalism" where less emphasis is given to national identity.

Globalism today is only another name for internationalism, and internationalism presupposes solid national integrity and nationalism. The more developed countries already have experienced the age of nationalism for a century or so, and they have learned that nationalism must be counter-balanced by internationalism. In the case of developing countries, however, the situation is very complex. On the one hand, national unification and integrity are essential for development, while at the same time, popular culture materials present cosmopolitan values which are not necessarily compatible with the fundamental stages of nationalism. [After all, James Bond may be a secret agent whose mission is to confuse the efforts toward nationalism and independence in the developing countries which were colonies of the west until only a few decades ago!]

Another important aspect of popular culture in developing countries is the fact that the newer media of communication often have a profound impact upon the traditional media. For example, the traveling story tellers and singers are disappearing as the result of the wider diffusion of broadcasting. In the case of Japan in the early 1930s, when the radio and the phonograph were introduced, hundreds of street singers and traveling story tellers were replaced by the electronic transmitters of popular culture. The same trend is apparent in the developing countries of Asia today on a more drastic scale, because the electronic technology of the 1970s, especially television, are much more advanced than those of the 1930s. If the traditional values specific to a culture are translated to the newer media, then it won't cause too much of a problem; but usually, broadcasters prefer not to produce electronic versions of traditional communication. Instead, they are content to broadcast imported programs.

Even when conscious efforts are made to preserve traditional values, the newer technology places constraints on older modes of communication. A classic example, again from Japan, is the change which took place in Sumo wrestling. Originally, Sumo was a part of religious ritual performed in the yards of shrines to entertain the deities; as secularization went on, it became purely a spectator sport. Yet Sumo as an entertainment retained some of the symbolic significance of its original form. For instance, the four corner pillars supporting the roof of the arena represented a Chinese philosophy of the universe; the Sumo performers even kept the old ritualistic manners until broadcasters decided to transmit the game to the general public. In the first place, an artificial time element was introduced. In the ancient game, two wrestlers were given ample time facing each other before a match started. It was necessary to wait until the time became "mature," and two opponents could spend more than ten minutes before their match actually began.

Radio broadcasters, however, did not like this ritual, for obvious reasons. They succeeded in limiting the "waiting time" to three minutes so that the day's series of matches could end at 6:30 p.m. This change in the form of the game took place in late 1930s.

When the TV camera came into the Sumo stadium in the late 1950s, the producers found the supporting pillars obstructive to the camera. Another negotiation took place, and finally, the Sumo association agreed to take out the pillars to give a better view of the arena to the TV camera. The form of this traditional sport had to adapt to the newer communication technologies.

In the countries of Asia, the traditional arts are the oldest and richest in the world. And to establish continuities between traditional media and newer electronic media will be a great task for the people of these countries.

The basic problem in designing such continuities and in promoting more "local" efforts is essentially an economic one. For example, the high ratio of imported programs broadcast in developing countries is simply a result of economic deliberation on the part of broadcasters. The importation of programs, especially TV programs, is much less expensive than local production of programs would be. A series of 13 one-hour programs can be purchased for several thousand U.S. dollars, while a local production of one 30-minute program would cost at least $3,000.00; it is doubtful if locally produced programs can be competitive with the imported programs. In short, the easiest way to attract a large audience for TV in developing countries is to broadcast American or Japanese programs that can be imported for a nominal fee (which the producers in more developed countries think of as an "initial investment"). China is probably the only country in Asia which avoided the danger by restricting the importation of popular culture from abroad, especially any importation from the capitalistic bloc. As a matter of fact, a UNESCO survey shows that there is very little importation of TV programs in China, and the few imported are from Eastern Europe. By doing so, China seems to have succeeded in preserving traditional culture and in constructing nationalism, although the arrangement had certain apparent shortcomings, such as the isolation of the people from much of the intercultural communication which other people enjoy. Burma and some other countries are following this pattern of communication isolation. They prefer to establish solid nationalism rather than to become "instant globalists"; no one can criticize their decision at a time when the sophisticated electronic coating is often contrary to the success of national development.

I am not suggesting that developing countries must follow the Chinese pattern. Rather I would like to suggest that there may be alternatives, where peoples of developing countries can take on a global coating and at the same time can be assured of their national identities. For example, if developed countries can put more emphasis on the export of the software techniques of program production rather than on canned programs, then independent, "local" programs, which serve national development, could be produced. And, if such local programs are produced successfully, then they should be multi-color, multi-participatory, and even multi-coated. The present danger is that the electronic coating is being done by a few countries, who use the same color--a color which other countries may not value.

POPULAR CULTURE RESEARCH RECONSIDERED

In his recent book The comic-stripped American, Arthur Asa Berger wrote "...we have lately become conscious of our general environment and there has been an explosion of interest in it--both in its physical manifestations (ecology) and its cultural ones (particularly popular culture)." And just as "ecology" made us aware of the critical dangers in the man-nature relationship, it is quite probabl that research in "popular culture" will reveal some of the basic ideo-psychological problems of our age.

Of course, both ecology and popular culture research are not new disciplines. In the past several decades, there have been pioneering works by a small number of scholars, but the majority of academicians have either rejected or ignored such minorities. Especially in the field of popular culture, the tendency was for many scholars to underestimate the importance of the problem area because of the "vulgarity" of the subject matter. They felt that popular culture research was not a serious intellectual venture simply because popular culture was not enjoyed by intellectuals. The pioneers, therefore, suffered from such prejudices. Even after the publication of Mass Culture by Rosenberg and White in the late 1950s and the establishment of Popular Culture Association in the early 1960s, the orthodox stream of the social sciences did not accept popular culture studies as an independent discipline. Their attitude was, "It's fun, but...." The intellectual climate for popular culture research has been the same or worse in countries other than the United States.

These handicaps are due partly to the ambiguity of the term popular culture. Indeed, even among popular culture students, the term means many things. There are groups of people who think that popular culture research is the study of popular entertainment, and includes the circus, television, comics, popular fiction, and movies. At the same time, there are those researchers for whom popular culture study is essentially the study of the life style of the people, and they would examine architectural styles, "pop art," food habits, and automobiles. A glance at the table of contents of an issue of the "Journal of Popular Culture"--the only scholarly journal in the field--gives the impression that popular culture research is something chaotic, and that impression is correct. It is chaotic. Unlike other established disciplines, popular culture research lacks "systematic" approach. It is based fundamentally on piece-meal, and often improvisational methods, in spite of the fact that the findings can be extremely important and thought-provoking. In this sense, popular culture research shares similarities with "folklore" studies, and it may be argued that popular culture is the contemporary version of folklore research.

Interestingly enough, however, it should be noted that modern communication research has been one of the origins of popular culture studies. As early as 1940, when Paul Lazarsfeld and others started "radio research," they were interested primarily in the impact of radio upon the listeners. Though both "communication research" and popular culture were not then established as technical terms the authors of radio research knew that popular culture was an integral unit in the study of social communications.

It is difficult to describe the relationship between communication research and popular culture research, but tentatively, popular culture research is concerned with the "content" and "effect" aspects of communication, especially mass communication. Indeed, often, mass media can be seen as one of the most decisive factors shaping the popular culture of a society. For example, the belief systems and behavior patterns of the younger generation in many societies today are strongly affected by the messages they prefer to receive (or are forced to receive) either directly or indirectly through mass media. Popular culture research is a form of communication research.

However, in considering the future development of popular culture research, there are several problems and cautions to be kept in mind.

POPULAR CULTURE RESEARCH SHOULD BE INTERDISCIPLINARY

Popular culture research is a branch of communication research in the view of communication specialists. But it is necessary to remember that there are several other groups who are interested in popular culture from different angles. For instance, sociologically-oriented authors and critics (Gilbert Seldes, George Orwell, Marshall McLuhan, etc.) have their own insights into the problems; anthropologists who are interested in the ethnography of industrial societies (Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict) are keen observers of popular culture. There are many psychologists, historians, poets, and artists who have ideas and interpretations of popular culture, too. What we should do, then, is to look forward to working with these people and to exchanging thoughts. In the past, there were many cases when intellectual inquiry lost its flexibility and creativity as the result of the ethnocentricism of a particular discipline. Popular culture is not to be monopolized by communication research people--popular culture is for everybody.

MASS MEDIA IS NOT THE SOLE COMPONENT OF POPULAR CULTURE

Much of the information we receive comes from mass media. Especially in the developed societies, where an "information explosion" is taking place, the mass of people are recipients (or victims) of messages which come from mass media. Naturally, these messages affect the way people think and act. The consumers in many countries today obediently purchase things that advertisements suggest they should. They construct their image of the world as the mass media tells them. There is no question about its impact.

But the mass media is not the only information source. People get information from the total environment and the mass media is merely a part. Popular culture research should not limit its scope to the studies of mass media. A researcher in popular culture must be curious enough to keep his eyes open, to observe such seemingly unrelated items as graphic design, jokes, gestures, the length of women's skirts, the color and design of automobiles, types of festivals and rituals, changes in food habits, patterns of courtship, architectural taste, sports, and assorted other daily facts and events. This may cause an intellectual mess, but popular culture research can enjoy and learn from just such a conglomeration.

POPULAR CULTURE RESEARCH SHOULD BE HISTORICAL

With the rise of mass media, especially movies, radio, and television, popular culture became "mass culture," but it is wrong to assume that popular culture came into existence only with mass media. As critics remind us, Shakespeare was a playwright for the general public of the day, and his theatrical arts were once considered popular culture. Indeed, each period of history has had a unique form of popular culture. The ballad, oral tradition, ornamental design, and even mythology are examples. The mass culture of developed societies today is simply a new strand of popular culture as it has existed throughout history. A society with little development in mass communication has its form of popular culture; this is where popular culture research may look for continuities with folklore and cultural history.

Every popular culture segment has strong historical roots. In the American scene, for instance, the art form known as the "musical" has its predecessor in the musical comedy in England, and Jazz evolved from the African past. "Jesus Christ Superstar" was the new popular culture item of the 1970s, but the musical could not have been the product of a non-Christian culture. As a matter of fact, very often, mass media are simply new vehicles through which historically molded beliefs are transmitted. In Japan, the first movie produced by Japanese movie makers was a film version of Kabuki; over radio, the most frequently heard tunes are those of Japanese popular songs. The same is true in any country. One of the most fascinating research areas, therefore, is to examine the evolutionary process of popular culture, or popular cultures.

Another implication of such an historical perspective is that the popular culture of each society is unique. The technology of communication is, generally speaking, universal; but the contents and functions of communication are culture-bound.

POPULAR CULTURE RESEARCH SHOULD BE COMPARATIVE

The fact that the popular culture of a particular society is unique means, however, that popular culture research is often apt to be particularistic. For instance, a scholar who became interested in Javanese puppet shows is so fascinated by the uniqueness that he may not pay much attention to similar art forms in other parts of Asia. As a matter of fact, one of the most serious ironies in popular culture research is that as research becomes more sophisticated, it becomes more difficult to appreciate the value of the findings for those who are outside of that particular culture. As the result, many of the contributions in popular culture research in the past are isolated; the approach has been too particularistic.

In this context, it seems necessary to expand our scope by introducing more comparative efforts. For example, the image of heroes in the popular literature of several societies may reveal many similarities as well as differences. It will be a contemporary version of comparative mythology, and through such comparative studies, we will be able to find the link by which isolated, individual research findings can be integrated.

THE "WORLD POPULAR CULTURE" SHOULD BE EXPLORED

Though it may seem contradictory with what has been discussed in preceding paragraphs, it should be noted that we are living in an age where a popular culture cannot be isolated totally. Thanks to the technological innovation in communication and transportation, a popular culture item which is produced in one country is diffused to a global scale. For example, good jazz can be heard in Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, New Delhi, and Moscow. A movie produced in Italy can attract audiences of millions in Mexico City, Sydney, Honolulu, and any part of the world. Sears Roebuck, an American mail order department store, recently established a Japanese branch; Japanese housewives place their orders through the world famous Sears catalogue, and order is transmitted by satellite to the Los Angeles office. There is no reason to assume that a housewife in California is more privileged than her counterpart in Japan, as far as mail-order shopping convenience is concerned. Indeed, on many occasions, we are forced to think that there is a genre which deserves to be named "world popular culture." The Beatles are, of course, the stars whose backgrounds are essentially British; but they are truly global stars. Karate is a Korean martial art, but there are thousands of Karate schools all over the world.

Christian Dior is a French designer, but his fashions reach the upper class women of practically every society (and the imitations reach women of every social strata).

In the field of the new media business, for obvious economic reasons, television programs made in more developed societies are being exported to less developed countries. As a result, such American programs as "I Love Lucy," "Bonanza," etc., have been shown to audiences in Europe, Asia, and South America. The more the audience becomes absorbed in such programs and characters, the more they tend to forget that they are imports.

Of course, the patterns of use and gratification of world popular culture may differ very much depending on the conditions of each society; but this is an age where popular cultures of the world are interpenetrating each other. From the communication viewpoint, world popular culture is an important problem area for intercultural communication.

In addition to these remarks, another important development in the world of popular culture must be noted. There has been an implicit dichotomy of "high-culture" and popular culture in the minds of people including popular culture students. But there is growing skepticism about such a dichotomy especially as it is exhibited in the developed countries. A good example is the way royal families of England or Japan are treated by the mass media. Until the 1940s, a King, Queen, or an Emperor was sacrosanct in many countries, and royal families did not appear in public except for certain ceremonial occasions. Their pictures were printed in newspapers several times a year, but the pictures were very formal, dignified portraits. With the democratization movement and the technological innovation of smaller cameras, however, the royal families today appear as ordinary human beings. As a matter of fact, in the case of Japan, Crown Princess Michiko is a star in women's weekly magazines. In the first page of every issue of these weekly magazines, readers find her snapshot (in color) in a more or less informal pose, and the running comments are usually about her clothes, jewelry, and makeup. She is a private citizen. Royal families can no longer be the sacred--"above the cloud."

Secularization is going on in every part of sanctuaries. National flags are often used in graphic or costume design; and we find such strange items as a trash can decorated by the Union Jack, or underwear with Stars and Stripes. Indeed, one of the functions of "pop art" was to secularize or to pull-down everything which had been ordained high-culture. The Watergate affair and other incidents of the top executive of the United States today is a popular culture item already. Universities, once the headquarters of high-culture, are now a part of popular culture. Even "counter-culture" is a popular culture.

In a word, a process which may be called "popular culturization" is developing at a tremendous speed. Popular culture research, in this social context, is challenging and promising. The only danger is the popular-culturization of popular culture research itself.

PROLOGUE

When Japanese university campuses exploded with protests and violence in 1968-1969, Kyoto University, where I was working, was no exception. Everyday there were demonstrations and confrontations, and in the summer of 1969, the university building where my office was located was taken over and barricaded by a group of radical students.

On the first of September of the year, the dean of the department finally decided to call the police force. The barricades were taken away and the students who had occupied the building were arrested. As soon as everything was over, I dashed to my office on the third floor to find that my office space was an absolute mess of paints, broken furniture, torn books, and left-over food. I checked my disorganized bookcase and found out thay my entire collection of back issues of "Garo," was missing. I was very sad, because I had been the only person on the campus who kept that collection of comics (university professors usually do not read comics, at least in their offices), and it was hopelessly impossible to replace the whole set, as comic magazines were extremely fugitive even in the publisher's warehouse.

Some days later, a student who had been inside the barricade but escaped arrest came to see me and said "Oh, we enjoyed your 'Garo' "; he apologized for his comrades, who had taken the magazines away to show to a group of students who occupied another building. I asked, out of my curiosity, why students liked the "Garo." The students answered "Kamui-den, of course!"

I must confess that I was not as attentive a reader of comic magazines as I was a collector, and I wondered why students were so fond of "Kamui-den." That question remained in my mind even after I left the campus in spring 1970, but without the original text, I was unable to study "Kamui-den" to find the answer.

In 1972, while browsing at a bookstore in Kyoto, to my surprise I found "Kamui-den" in paperbacks. Apparently, the comic strips published in the "Garo" had been compiled in book form. Without hesitation I purchased the entire 21-volume set and started to read. This essay is a tentative answer to the question inspired by those innocently violent students who occupied my office, several years ago, and to them I dedicate this research.

H. K.

Honolulu, 1974

INTRODUCTION

Nobuhiro Takemoto was suspected to be a leader of the organization called the Japan Red Army, whose members engaged in several hijackings, including the cruel massacre at Tel Aviv airport in 1972. When he was a graduate student at Kyoto University in the 1960's, Takemoto had been a devoted reader of the Garo, an avant-garde monthly comic magazine. In a letter to its editors in the November 1965 issue, he said "I am a graduate student in the department of economics, studying the revolutionary thoughts of Karl Marx. My hope is to revitalize Marxism, which at present is in the hands of formalistic eggheads. In this context, I feel that the comics by Mr. Sampei Shirato sharply touch my problem area, and I am reading his works most intensively. .... I am keeping all the issues so that they can be read by other people, including my son."

Three years later, the young radical Takemoto was appointed an assistant in his department. A legendary organizer of the student movement on campus in 1968-69, he disappeared and went underground in 1970 when a warrant was issued for his arrest. The "Takemoto problem" is still one of the basic issues in the student unrest.

It is sheer nonsense to hypothesize a simple cause-and-effect relationship between Mr. Takemoto's absorption in Mr. Shirato's comics and his underground operations, but it was quite probable that the images of the comic strip's heroic figures frequently crossed his mind when he was sitting with other activists discussing their strategies and tactics.

In the late 1960's, it was fashionable for student newspapers to print commentaries on the works of Mr. Shirato and to encourage their readers to learn from the comics. For instance, a student editor for Musashi University campus newspaper commented in 1966 that "... Mr. Shirato's comics are based on historical materialism, and the agrarian revolt which Mr. Shirato depicts in his works must be projected to contemporary revolutionary movements. In conclusion, Mr. Shirato's comics are lessons for our revolutionary practice." Critics of this easy learning of revolution from comic books argued that students must read Marx and Engels to have more sophisticated ideas of revolution; but the students, who also opposed elitism and snobbism, preferred to read comics. It seemed, interestingly enough, that their counter-snobbism which turned out to be another new form of snobbism, accompanied by long-hair, flowers, and the cult of innocence and childishness. And the Garo might have been a part of it.

When the editors of the magazine conducted a readership survey, they discovered that the average age of the readers was 21, and 70 percent of them were students, mostly males with urban backgrounds. Also, many of the readers were found to be serious intellectuals (or would-be intellectuals) who were attentive to sophisticated intellectual magazines as well as Garo. When the editors asked "What would you like to do now?", the most frequent answer was "traveling," followed by "revolution" and "student movements." There were also such unique responses as "to destroy the parliament building by dynamite," "fighting," "to kill people with rifle," and "confrontation with police troop with the Garo in my pocket." It is difficult to generalize the ideological orientations of readers from a simple survey such as this, but as will be discussed later, they appeared to be anarchistic rather than communistic, utopian rather than revolutionary, and, as symbolized by the case of Takemoto, it was probable that the readers of the Garo were at odds not only with the police force but also with communist party members, who were much more organized and theoretically oriented. (When Takemoto talked about "formalistic eggheads" he meant members of the orthodox communist party). In that sense, the Garo can be seen as one of the vitamins, if not the main sustenance, of the ultra-leftist activities on university campuses in the late 1960's, whether or not Mr. Shirato intended that effect. But there are reasons to believe that Mr. Shirato fully intended to propagate his revolutionary ideas through comics. As we shall see later, he made many explicit comments on the socio-economic contradictions of our age as he developed his stories.

Mr. Shirato was born in 1925 in Tokyo, the son of Mr. Karaki Okamoto, who had been a left-wing artist since the pre-war period. Because of war, poverty, and his father's distrust of school education, Mr. Shirato did not finish his higher education. He started his career as an illustrator for Kamishibai, an original entertainment medium for younger children in Japan since the middle of the nineteenth century. Kamishibai, literally meaning "pictorial theater," was a street show where a narrator told various stories to children with the aid of a series of still pictures, and in order to attract the audience, the narrators needed new and exciting stories and pictures all the time. Mr. Shirato, being a son of an artist and an artist himself, could create these pictures at ease. When he joined left-wing cultural movements in the 1950's, he was pleased at the opportunity to experiment with Kamishibai as a means of education and propaganda.

Kamishibai, however, became outdated when television came onto the scene. Japanese children, for obvious reasons, ceased to go out to see Kamishibai, preferring to stay at home with its electronic version. Mr. Shirato thus lost his job, and tried to make a shift from Kamishibai illustrator to comic strip artist. But he was not satisfied by the nonsensical funny comics. He was more interested in producing serious stories aided by pictures. In 1963, his pictorial story of Ernest Seton's "Wild Animals I Have Known" won the Children's Comics Award and since then, he has been producing long, serious comics known as Gekiga.

Gekiga, or "dramatic comics," is a new genre which emerged in Japanese popular culture during the middle 1960's. It is a kind of comics, but is not necessarily funny. It is very often a serious illustrated story, though the media which carry Gekiga are usually comic magazines. Mr. Shirato has been one of the leading Gekiga producer-writers, and many of his works are classics of the genre.

While Mr. Takemoto was writing his letter to the editors (mentioned earlier), Mr. Shirato was energetically producing new monthly segments of his everlasting serial "Kamui-den" in the Garo. Indeed, "Kamui-den," which was started in December 1964, took some 100 pages of a periodical whose total pages were little over 200; it is

safe to say that the magazine's major attraction was "Kamui-den," and that the work which impressed Takemoto so much was this particular serial. The readership survey revealed also that more than 50 percent of the readers nominated Mr. Shirato as their favorite contributor to the magazine. Among Mr. Shirato's major works, therefore, "Kamui-den" is a good subject for a case study of the dynamics of comics and university radicals and of the role of serious comics in youth culture at large.

THE STORY

"Kamui-den" ("The Legend of Kamui") is a voluminous epic in comics form, produced and drawn by Sampei Shirato. Serial publication in the Garo began in 1964 and has continued ever since. In 1971, the stories published to that date were compiled into 21 volumes of paperbacks of 300 pages each--some 50,000 frames of pictures altogether--and the author stated in his postscript to volume 21 that it was merely the end of Part I of "Kamui-den," which eventually would consist of three parts. One might expect, therefore, another 40 volumes of the continuing story of "Kamui-den" in the years to come. This, of course, is one of the longest stories in the history of comic books; as Toshio Kagawa, a playwright, commented, it is comparable with Wagner's "Der Ring des Nibelungen" or Tolstoy's War and Peace. More than 50 major characters have appeared in the story, and the social relationships among the characters are extremely complex. The story goes on continually depicting power and suppression, joy and agony, hopes and discouragement, and above all, the life and death of the characters. It's a long story, but never boring.

The setting of the story is eighteenth century Japan, when feudal lords dominated the peasant society; "Kamui-den" is essentially a story of feudal exploitation and of agrarian revolt against it. It is a story about a violent revolution and many of the heroes die in the process of the glorious struggle. In this sense, "Kamui-den" is revolutionary literature, and this is the precise reason that student activists were attracted by the story.

The term "Kamui" carries a somewhat intricate connotation. The word originates with the Ainu, an aboriginal ethnic group of Japan whose descendants survive as a minority group in Hokkaido; "Kamui" means "god," or something "sacred." Kamui is the name of the hero of the story, but at the same time it is used to mean any heroic figure or event. It may be safe to say that the word "Kamui" is what Wagner would define as the "Leitmotif" of the story. Because the Ainu are a neglected and suppressed minority, the title "Kamui" is symbolic of the contents of the epic. Mr. Shirato is very sophisticated in his approach to the theme and, in spite of the realism of his style, he has been quite successful in leaving a certain ambiguity so that a reader could identify contemporary counterparts out of this historical drama. As a matter of fact, Mr. Shirato commented in the first volume of the series, "If your righteous demands as a human being are ignored and suppressed, you will surely be indignant and frustrated! Today, in spite of the developments of human societies permitting life to be full of joy, the real facts are quite contrary. This is the story of those people who tried hard to make progress in seventeenth century Japan."

The story begins in a poor farming village in a feudal territory fictitiously called "Heki territory." The feudal lord governing the territory is sadistically cruel and ignorant, and he exploits the farmers with heavier taxation every year.

Get Out!

Like many other rulers, his policy is "divide and rule," and in this case, he divides the people of his territory by status and discrimination. The top social class, of course, is the Samurai or warriors, headed by the lord of the territory. Then come the farmers, but they were divided into two classes, Hyakushō (independent farmers) and Genin (serf). Below Genin is a caste called Hinin, who are engaged in such dirty jobs as the processing of the dead bodies of animals, and their community is segregated from that of the farmers. Even the mountain passes and river banks that the Hinin can use are segregated from those of farmers. Farmers, Hyakushō and Genin together, look down on the Hinin as if they were not human beings. Another special assignment for Hinin is the execution of criminals. The leaders of agrarian revolt, for instance, are executed at the hands of Hinin. The tension between farmers and Hinin is thus reinforced, and mutual hatreds and hostilities are created and perpetuated.

Oh, you Hinin
eat dog food!

Because of heavy taxation, the farmers revolt periodically against the tyranny of the lord, but the revolts are always unsuccessful, and every time the leading figures are arrested and killed. It is in this context that Shōsuke, a hero of the story, comes on the scene. Shōsuke belongs to Genin, but his ideas are liberal and he sees no reason why Hinin should be segregated and discriminated against. He devotes his efforts to combining the powers of farmers and Hinin. He himself falls in love with a Hinin girl and gets married.

Shōsuke

The younger brother of the girl Shōsuke marries is another heroic figure, Kamui. He, naturally, belongs to the Hinin class, but he chooses to live as a lone-wolf, a solitary fighter rather than a member of an organized movement. Through mysterious training in the mountains, Kamui acquires super-human abilities and helps Shōsuke and others.



Kamui disciplines himself in the woods

There is a sympathizer of Shōsuke among the young Samurai, too. Tatsunoshin, a son of a very important family, joins with the farmers after unfortunate experiences in the factional struggle and complications within the Samurai class. He comes to believe that the government must be overthrown. Through a series of accidents, he lives with Hinin and learns the realities of the life of the lower class people.

Fencing is basic for a
Samurai

Another important figure in the story is Shichibei, an ambitious merchant who looks for free trade and big profit. He is opposed to the feudal lord, whose economic policy is very restrictive, and he acts as the financier for innovative farmers such as Shōsuke. He can be an ally of the suppressed in the sense that the lord is their common enemy. Here again is a classic formula--the temporary solidarity between bourgeois and farmers--and as the formula of Marxism predicts, this solidarity is broken as soon as Shichibei gains economic hegemony in the territory.

Shichibei, a strategist

Then . . .

Power is to manipulate,
not to rely upon

Victorious farmers

We're surrounded!

The difficulties and unrest in the territory are reported by a special group of spies to the shogunate, or the central government of the day, which looks for any justification to confiscate the territory from the lord. At last, the lord is killed by a terrorist, and the territory is confiscated by the central government. Tatsunoshin, because of his popularity with the farmers, is appointed as the local governor, and he tries very hard to abolish discrimination and to make the people happy. This "Weimar" period, however, does not last: since Tatsunoshin is too liberal and too nice to the people, the central government replaces him. The agony and suffering of the farmers begins anew, and in the process all of the heroes die.

Confrontation

This is the end of part one of the story. There are many other important side stories which cannot be de described here in detail, but in the following pages, three major heroes, namely Kamui, Shōsuke, and Tatsunoshin will be studied in close-ups.

THE TRINITY OF HEROES

SHŌSUKE: ORGANIZER, EDUCATOR, AND INNOVATOR

When he was a child, Shōsuke asked his father why people discriminate against Hinin. Father answered "It's a matter of birth. They are different." Shōsuke retorted, "Then, are we Genin different from Hyakushō by birth? Are we?" His father just could not answer. After this incident, Shōsuke did not hesitate to play with the kids of Hinin class, in spite of the adults' warnings. He also learned why his father hated Hinin so much. The father confessed one day about the tragedy of Shōsuke's mother. She was born Hinin and did not tell her husband about her birth till Shōsuke was born. The aggrieved husband suddenly regretted his marriage, and out of anger, he kicked his wife. The desperate woman left the house and committed suicide.

Are we different?

Shōsuke's life became more sad and tragic when his elder sister (who once was in love with Tatsunoshin, another hero) was killed by a brutal Samurai. Being a boy of the Genin class, he could do nothing about his misery and misfortune.

2 1

4 3

6 5

(1) Your mother told me the secret

(2) I got mad and kicked her

(3) She ran away into the snow

(4) and killed herself

(5) So, you hated Hinin
What a fool I was

However, his ambition was never discouraged. First of all, he wanted to learn to read. There was of course no school, and he had to educate himself. Soon he was able to read the documents of the village chief, the local representative of power, and he learned that the village chief had been dishonest in tax allocation. Shōsuke accused him of this injustice. Shōsuke was arrested and almost executed, but being a smart boy, he had given a copy of the document to Kamui so that the injustice would be reported to higher officials if he were executed. Shōsuke had not intended blackmail, but in effect, the village chief proposed that he would give Shōsuke the status of Hyakushō (an independent farmer with a small parcel of land) in exchange for a copy of the document. Shōsuke accepted this offer.

A copy is in the hands of my friend

He will bring it to the office if I don't make contact

You . . .

He became a hardworking, independent farmer, and he thought that perhaps a cash crop other than rice would bring bring more profit for the farmers. He visited neighboring communities and learned that growing cotton could be a good business. He made an experimental pilot farm where he got good yield of cotton. The farmers, especially the younger ones, admired Shōsuke as the new leader of the village and helped him. He later introduced silk production, and saw an opportunity to sell both cotton and silk to the merchants on the free market. He went to the big urban centers to check the current price of cotton and silk, lest he be cheated by the merchants. The products of the village were sold on bids, and Shichibei came onto the scene. He encouraged Shōsuke to produce more and financed his projects, including a large-scale irrigation construction.

Look! cotton flowers

Is this cotton?

Never seen before

The agriculture financed by commercial capital required more organized labor, and for that purpose, too, the discrimination and segregation of Hinin from farmers had to be abolished. Therefore, in the village, the two classes of people worked together, sharing the joy of communal projects. The lord of the territory felt a threat in Shōsuke's activities because he saw them as a menace to the existing power structure, and the antagonism between the lord and farmers was intensified. Finally, a military confrontation took place. The farmers, armed with farming tools, fought against the lord's army in vain. Shōsuke, a pacifist, could not stop the violence, but he was arrested as the suspected leader. The farmers, as well as Hinin, however, testified in court that Shōsuke was not participating in the riot, and he was released.

Throughout his life, Shōsuke was a legalist. He discouraged the use of violence, and suggested rather a Gandhi-likenon-violent resistance. He believed in law and justice, and every time he was arrested, he insisted that he would talk about anything, but only in the court where he could see responsible officers; he was never defeated by sadistic tortures.

He also believed in collective action for farmers. He said that the power of an individual was weak, but a well-organized group of individuals could be the strongest power in the world, even stronger than a lord's army. He encouraged communal life. For instance, he organized villagers to collectively purchase the daily necessities so that farmers could bargain on the price. Indeed, Shōsuke was a fictional pioneer in consumer cooperative movement. He organized such community organizations as youth clubs and children's clubs so that young people could exchange ideas. Young girls who had been educated by Shōsuke grew up to be teachers in the community school. A nursery school also was built so that parents could leave their small children while working in the farm. With the permission of the lord's office, which always looked for more taxes from more land, Shōsuke undertook a new project to convert wilderness into new farmland, so that more independent farmers could migrate and settle.

Farmers moved into the new village



School was built

Shōsuke can be defined as an innovator of early capitalism, comparable with Benjamin Franklin and, like him, an inventor. He invented many new agricultural tools to save energy and to intensify agricultural production. He was, as seen before, a liberal-minded person who dared to marry to a girl who belonged to the Hinin class. The villagers, who had been prejudiced against Hinin, celebrated their marriage and the solidarity between farmers and Hinin grew.

The happiness did not, however, continue. The village was attacked by a dreadful flood; the lord had cut most of the trees on the mountainside to get quick cash, and the rains ran off quickly and swelled the river. The farmers decided, again, to revolt against the lord. Shōsuke persuaded them not to, and with the help of Shichibei, the merchant, he took the whole population of the village to another territory where they could work, at least temporarily, in a silver mine. The lord of the mining terrritory also was cruel, and many migrated farmers lost their lives.

The lord of Shōsuke's village, meanwhile, was accused by the central government of injustice and misconduct, and as soon as the news reached the migrated farmers, they decided to return home. They learned when they arrived that Tatsunoshin, who once had spent part of his life with the farmers, was the new governor of the village. The alliance of Shōsuke and Tatsunoshin created a kind of Utopia. But the Tatsunoshin Era was a very short one, and another exploitative governor soon took the office. The new governor was as bad as the former lord, and Shōsuke could no longer be patient. The only action he could take was to report to the central government himself. He went to Kyoto, then to Edo, was put in jail and tortured.

Shosuke's last plea

We wanted to defend our farm!
I can't understand why you ruin our village! We defended what we had to!

In spite of his firm belief in law and justice, his mission was unsuccessful. He went back home, almost half-dead (his tongue was cut by torture), and the villagers who had insisted on violent revolt did not support Shōsuke any more. Mr. Shirato, the author, says simply "...after that he disappeared, nobody saw him."

Shōsuke was a model of democracy, a textbook by himself. But the textbook could not change the society, except for temporary reforms and short-lived innovations.

KAMUI: AN UNDERGROUND LONE-WOLF

Kamui was a fearless, militant, and isolated hero. He belonged to the Hinin class, and he knew that he could not rise above it. But instead of being exploited and suppressed by both farmers and Samurai, he chose to engage himself in a special assignment. The ruling class, the Samurai, was clever enough to give a special mission to selected Hinin: Espionage. The Samurai needed secret information about farmers who were potential subversives to their power. Hinin, who were discriminated against and often treated as non-human by the farmers, could take a sado-masochistic pleasure in these espionage missions. The selected Hinin also could enjoy more freedom and less labor, in comparison with most of the people belonging to this class, who had to butcher dead animals. Kamui chose to be one of the spies, or to take an intellectually dirty job rather than a physically dirty one.

In order to be a spy, one had to be strong and swift. Kamui, wearing an animal hide and a sword, trained himself in the mountains. He was a "nature boy" so to speak, and he learned quick and smooth bodily actions from the wild animals he observed. He could jump from tree to tree like a monkey, and swim in the water like a trout.

And like a wild animal, he was prepared to fight against any danger he faced. He knew that nobody would help him, and he saw the world as a place where the strongest takes all. He had no friend. Even when a boy came to ask him if he could give him certain training, Kamui answered calmly, "You should take care of yourself! Nobody will help you."

After all, nobody helps people

You need guts

Don't ask anything of anybody!

Yes

Espionage, however, was not as simple as it seemed. Even though the activities of spies were directed by the Samurai, it was very difficult for a man like Kamui to feel he was a part of the power structure; he knew that the real enemy was the Samurai class and not farmers. Especially in view of the fact that his elder sister Nana was married to Shōsuke, Kamui tended to give support to the farmers under the disguise of a spy dispatched by Samurai. He, in a sense, was a double agent, like "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold." Indeed, Kamui was a

tragic figure, and like most spies, especially double agents, he was perpetually in danger. Above all, his job being what it was, he could not tell who were his "enemies" and who were his "friends." Only by quick judgment and action could he keep himself alive. He killed people with a draw of sword as if he were chopping carrots.

If I didn't, I'd have been killed . . .

I killed him.

Because of his extraordinary skill, he was selected as a member of a spy organization of higher ranking where training in Ninjutsu, or the mysterious martial arts, was given. The rules and regulations of the organization were so strict and absolute that anyone who betrayed them, or tried to escape from the organization had to be killed by his colleagues. No member could trust any other member. Kamui was ordered by the top boss of the organization to kill his teacher, who had become skeptical and was planning to drop out of the group. However, during this desperate chase, Kamui also became skeptical about the meaning of his life as an "organization man" who had always to follow the orders of his superiors; eventually, he decided to escape from the organization.

2

1

4

(1) What a life I am living

(2) But I can't start it again

(3) then . . .

(4) What's the meaning?

(5) Are you happy?

6

5

Naturally, his escape might mean his death. He became one of the deviants who was chased by killers like himself. The socio-psychological setting of Kamui was not as simple as that of Shōsuke. Kamui, first of all, was a member of the alienated class, Hinin, and then decided to alienate himself even from other Hinin by becoming a member of the spy organization, but that was not all. He then alienated himself from the organization to which he belonged, at his own serious risk. The life he was living was, in a word, a perpetual process of alienation. He had no friend, except for animals. He asked his questions to himself and he had to answer to the questions. Indeed, Kamui was a militant existential philosopher, and one may even see a variation of André Malraux in the monologues of Kamui.

What made his situation worse was that he finally discovered the secret of the central government. The discovery, which Kamui made by an energetic search of the old secret documents, was something fantastic: according to the secret papers, the Tokugawa family, the dominant power of Japan at that time, actually came from the Hinin class, and all the sophisticated geneologies of the family had been a fake. This, of course, was a serious matter. If the secret leaked, the whole power structure based on a rigid status system would have lost its justification. The central government, who knew that Kamui had learned the secret, started their own hunt for him, mobilizing their whole police force and secret service. Kamui became a most desperate fugitive, but he survived underground by his own skill and strength as a superhuman hero.

Unlike Shōsuke, Kamui did not have any belief in, or even a sense of, justice. He did not have any political ambition. He just wanted to live his own life as a free human being. His ideological orientation was anarchy combined with wild naturalism. He was usually cynical about most human affairs, but yet he came onto the scene where two other major heroes, namely Shōsuke and Tatsunoshin, were in danger, and he helped them. He avoidded, however, any emotional involvement with them. He was a cool boy, and at the end of the story, a reader would wonder if he was still alive. It seems that even Mr. Shirato does not know where Kamui has gone.

TATSUNOSHIN: THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING ELITES

The early training of Tatsunoshin was quite a contrast to that of the other two heroes. Born to one of the key families of the ruling class, he was given the best education as a future elite. He was taught by his teacher that martial arts such as fencing were required if the Samurai class, whose number was small, was to rule the majority, the farmers.

military is to
keep the power

Then?

You need power to govern
the people, and . . .

His father was the highest ranking official in the lord's castle. He was a capable secretary of the territorial government, and his brilliance could compensate, partially, for the ignorance and mischief of the lord. However, the lord liked him less than another, evil-minded official, and by a series of conspiracies, had him killed. Moreover, the lord ordered that every single person among Tatsunoshin's family and relatives be extinguished. Miraculously, however, Tatsunoshin was able to escape; he hid himself in the deep mountains, and there he met an old man. The old man was a famous retired swordsman, and Tatsunoshin was given extraordinarily hard training. In his mind, there was one absolute goal: revenge. His former lord reigned as the object of his hate and vendetta, and he could barely wait for his chance.

One day, when the lord was hunting, Tatsunoshin carelessly tried to attack him. He found that it was he who was actually being attacked, and he could have been killed by the lord's troops if it were not for Kamui's adventurous help. Tatsunoshin was too naive to fight a strategic war.

Oh you!

Mr. Tatsu-noshin

No. You shouldn't die here

leave me!

Wait!

Go quick!

After the incident, of course, the search for Tatsunoshin was intensified and he could not escape into the mountains. Once again assisted by Kamui, he decided to hide himself in an isolated Hinin hamlet where the Samurai would not dare to inspect. He even cut his hair so that he would look like a Hinin. The situation was analogous to that of an underground activist hiding himself in a slum area. And as in a contemporary slum, the living conditions in the Hinin community were extremely bad.

Especially for a person like Tatsunoshin, who had been brought up in an upper class family, the life of the Hinin class was intolerable, even with his wild experience in the mountains. As a member of the community, he had to work with other members, whose job was to dispose of the dead bodies of animals. He was instructed by the leader of the community to take off the skin of a dead cow. The rotten body of the animal made him retch, and he, as a man still belonging to the Samurai class, almost decided to kill himself rather than to take such a dirty job. He also refused to eat the food he was served, which stank.

Heavy

It stinks

He was touched and ashamed, however, when he learned that the food was prepared from left-overs which young Hinin children had begged from the farmers' kitchens and brought back that he might eat. The most underprivileged people in the society, Tatsunoshin found out, were also human beings who were trying to help their new member survive. He told himself that he had to live with these people, and gradually he came to feel that helping the miserable people, Hinin and farmers inclusive, was a far more important task for him than seeking revenge, which was, after all, a personal matter. He became aware that assassinating the lord would not mean anything; there would always be another equally bad Samurai who would succeed to the lord's castle. Thus, he concluded that elimination of the individual lord was not enough, and that the whole Samurai class had to be eliminated. Because Tatsunoshin himself was a member of Samurai class, his conclusion meant self-denial.

While living in the village, he became acquainted with Shōsuke and learned from him. One day he had a philosophical dialogue with Shōsuke, who said, pointing to a big old tree, "Look at that tree. If you want to cut down the tree, you should have tools, such as an ax and saw. Unless you have these tools, you can't do anything about the tree. I think the tools that we have now are the results of human struggle which has continued for centuries." Tatsunoshin asked him, "Then, how many years do you think it takes for our generation to change the

society?" Shōsuke answered, "I don't know. We can cut down a tree easily, but in order to cut down a castle, we need another, stronger tool." Tatsunoshin put his next question: "What do you mean by 'a stronger tool'?" Shōsuke answered, "Power. The power of the people working and producing. The power of hundreds of farmers. Pick up a hair. It's hopelessly weak. But if you make a rope out of thousands of hairs, even a sword can't cut it." Tatsunoshin was happy to be a part of Shōsuke's organization.

However, he could not totally agree with Shōsuke's non-violent resistance. After seeing many farmers killed by the tyranny of the lord, Tatsunoshin separated himself from the pacifism of Shōsuke and organized a guerrilla troop with other Samurai drop-outs. It was a Robin Hood-style militia--helping farmers and harassing the lord's army. Naturally, Tatsunoshin's militia was the strongest component in a series of agrarian riots.

Farmers, be united

Don't be trapped!!

That's the only enemy

The guerrilla activities continued successfully, although with the sacrifice of hundreds of farmers' lives, until the lord was discharged by the central government. In order to quiet the excited farmers, the central government awarded the position of the governor of the territory to Tatsunoshin. He, of course, was a qualified person as he was the son of an important family, and with his past experience with the farmers, he was an ideal governor for getting along with the people. On the day he took office, he came to the village to see Shōsuke, and shook his hand.

Let's look forward

Since he had had such an experience with the underprivileged people, he understood his territory in detail. He was an enlightened ruler, and encouraged democratic action among the people. It was, as was suggested before, a kind of "Weimar Republic." He, however, found out that he had a new enemy, the central government. The central government was worried by his enlightened policy and gave him instructions that the status system had to be reinstated. Tatsunoshin refused such instruction and warnings until at last he was discharged. When his successor arrived, Tatsunoshin went to see him and insisted on justice. The new governor drew his sword and killed him.

Tatsunoshin was an understanding member of the elite; but because he was too understanding, his life ended in tragedy.

MARX, DARWIN, OR ....?

As we have seen briefly, "Kamui-den" is essentially a revolutionary comic, yet it is hard to define this work as propaganda literature. The author, Mr. Shirato, seems to present diversified patterns of revolutionary action rather than a single orthodox approach. The three young heroes represent three "ideal types" of rebels in an authoritarian social structure, and, as was hinted elsewhere, Mr. Shirato made both implicit and explicit the implications of these heroes for contemporary society--an amazingly sophisticated style. Shōsuke, for instance, is an innovator who feels that farmers could be happier even in a feudal society, if law and justice were practiced. He is a success-minded person, and has no qualms about making a deal with the village chief, who promotes him by special arrangements to Hyakushō status from the Genin class. He is pleased to accept a promotion which he cannot share with his fellow Genin, even with his father. In spite of his democratic ideals and cooperative ventures, it seems that Shōsuke is essentially the hero of a success story, a model for other ambitious young men. He teaches the hopeful lesson that a lower class serf can be an independent farmer if he is diligent and confident. The young people of today might project the life style and philosophy of Shōsuke to the opposition parties in contemporary parliamentary democracy. The parties are very active and critical of the government's policies. They demand, for instance, a larger social welfare budget, less military expenditure, etc. They encourage consumers' cooperatives and labor unions. They appeal to the people to unite and to establish solidarity. These are very nice ideas, and the opposition parties may be able to succeed in gradually changing the government's policies. But gradualism is not a revolutionary idea. By definition, militant radicals would not put much hope in parliamentary democracy, and for that reason, they would not accept Shōsuke as their hero.

If Shōsuke falls into the category of "innovation" in Robert Merton's scheme of anomie and deviant behavior, Tatsunoshin is fundamentally a conformist, in spite of his seemingly rebellious life. Of course, he is an exceptional Samurai who understands the facts of life in the poor peasants' village. But his adventurous life, after all, seems to be another version of the "beggar prince" story. Tatsunoshin has a wonderful and strange experience with the farmers, but it is an accidental and temporary event. The lessons he learns from the farmers are simply his "reference materials" as a member of the ruling class. Sometimes, he feels that he should deny his class and himself, but he cannot escape the Samurai consciousness. His Robin Hood-style guerilla warfare may please and excite the radical students on the contemporary university campus, who are not quite satisfied by parliamentary democracy, but his groovy guerilla warfare might well be viewed as what Lenin has labeled "leftist adventurism." He is a brave swordsman, and he feels that the farmers must revolt, unknowing that the time is not mature. Above all, this Robin Hood does not stay with the farmers. He accepts the governorship of the territory when the position is offered. He is the best governor the farmers could hope for, and he has good justifications and reasons for accepting the appointment. Nobody can blame him. But the important quality of Tatsunoshin is that he is an elite throughout his life. He is destined to stay inside the elite class. He may feel that he is one of the common people, but such a feeling is self-deceiving. He is an exceptional Samurai, but he remains a Samurai no matter how exceptional he is. Tatsunoshin is like a young radical student who propagates populism but takes a job as a promising young executive in a big company upon his graduation. His deviance is incidental and accidental; in the long run, he is a conformist. Tatsunoshin is conscientious enough to work for the people, and he never betrays them. As a result, he had to be executed. But he dies an honorable Samurai death.

Kamui is a contrast to both Shōsuke and Tatsunoshin in the sense that the world he lives in is different. He is cynical, not impressed by the glorious social justice toward which other heroes strive, and he tries to live his life as an unrestricted, free individual. He also seems to be rebellious as far as his fighting with and killing of the Samurai are concerned, but he would fall into the category of "retreatism" of Merton's scheme. Merton said, "People who adapt in this fashion are, strictly speaking, in the society but not of it. Sociologically, these constitute the true aliens. Not sharing the common frame of values, they can be included as members of the society (in distinction from the population) only in a fictional sense." Further, he stated, "It is, moreover, a privatized rather than a collective mode of adaptation. Although people exhibiting this deviant behavior may gravitate toward centers where they come into contact with other deviants, and although they may come to share in the subculture of these deviant groups, their adaptations are largely private and isolated rather than unified under the aegis of a new cultural goal."

Indeed, Kamui is an isolated, alienated hero. He is desperately tired of all the complications of human society, and he retreats. To where?

As we have seen, Mr. Shirato's career as a comic artist began with the illustrated story of Seton's books on wild animals. He, according to his biographical notes, was keenly interested in animal life, and that was why he chose Seton for his debut. As a matter of fact, his pictures of animals are often much more vivid than those of human beings. The theme of "nature," therefore, is an indispensable component of his works, and "Kamui-den" is no exception.

The first page of volume one of "Kamui-den," for instance, begins with a scene of animals in the mountains, accompanied by this narration: "This year, in this area, was a rich year, both for animals and for human beings." In the following ten pages, the lives of animals are introduced. The basic principle which governs the lives of animals is that of the ecological cycle. A tree's leaves are eaten by the deer, who in turn are attacked by a group of wolves. It is a Darwinian world, and a story of these animals precedes the story about human beings. Mr. Shirato even gives lectures on ecology in these passages.

In a side story about a group of wolves, Mr. Shirato creates a lone wolf. The wolf, who happens to have white fur, is segregated from other wolves and is not permitted to join the group. The wolf has to go hunting alone to get food for himself. The author gives the name of "Kamui" to this lone wolf, and that wolf becomes the antecedent for the hero Kamui who appears several pages later; the parallel development of two Kamuis--human and animal--is combined in a style reminiscent of a counterpoint in musical composition. The word "Kamui," therefore, is used quite ambiguously from the beginning, though in most of the cases, it is used as the name of the human hero.

The parallel description of two Kamuis gives the impression that the basic view of Mr. Shirato is that of the naturalist who regards human beings as a species whose position in the earth is equal with that of other species. Like hunting wolves, human beings are also cruel, and like deer, they are surrounded by dangers all the time. The world of animals, including the human animal, in "Kamui-den" is a Leviathan one. And in this comic, humans are animals, contrary to the Walt Disney approach where animals are humans.

The role of Kamui, the hero, in this context, functions to mediate and combine human society with that of other creatures. The word "Kamui" itself is ambiguous and mysterious, probably even for Mr. Shirato himself. One may suspect that "Kamui" could mean "elan vital" in the sense of Jean Jacques Rousseau's treatise. "Kamui" in itself is a Weltanschaung.

From the "Kamui" viewpoint, therefore, all the human efforts, including revolution, are negligible variations on the wider theme of natural history. The final picture of volume 21 is of a dark, stormy sea. Mr. Shirato comments:

"People are born in different places, coming together in a sea called life.
The sea is rough and never pacified, endlessly."

COFFEE, TEA, OR WHAT?
--The Role of "Stimulants" in Human Communication

THE DIFFUSION OF TEA DRINKING

According to a Chinese legend, tea was first tried by the Emperor Shen Nung sometime around 2000 B.C. The tea that he drank was allegedly brought to him by a group of explorers who had gone to a mountain area of Yunnan, close to the Chinese border with Assam. The fragrance, taste, and the refreshing effects of tea attracted Chinese nobles in the court, and thus it became a favorite drinking beverage among Chinese.

Tea was especially well received by Buddhist monks, who were prohibited from taking alcohol and found tea a worthy substitute because it contained caffeine and tannin and had a comfortably stimulating and awakening effect. Another story tells of Darma, a legendary Buddhist patriarch who devoted himself to seven years of sleepless meditation, and who was the first person to use tea in order to keep himself awake.

Tea at this early stage, however, was not served in the way we are familiar with. A Chinese document of the 3rd century A. D. says that the tea leaves were pressed like a brick; when it was served, it had to be crushed and mixed with onion, ginger, orange, and other spices, and then hot water was poured over the mixture. Tea was used at this stage as a medicine rather than as an ordinary beverage.

No matter who the discoverer was, there is no doubt that the Chinese were the tea drinkers who first started this habit thousands of years ago. Moreover, in the following centuries, tea became a necessary accompaniment to social gatherings of literati as a medium of better and more sophisticated intellectual discussions. Scholars, high-ranking officials, and monks sat together with a cup of tea, enjoying the most philosophical discourse for hours. The Emperor during the 5th century owned the best tea garden in the country, and drinking a good cup of tea became an obvious status symbol.

It is no wonder then that tea itself became a subject of intellectual inquiry in China. In 780 A. D., a scholar by the name of Lu Yu wrote a classic three-volume treatise on tea titled "Ch'a Ching." He described the wisdom of growing and manufacturing tea, and at the same time he gave instructions on the proper manner of drinking tea, including twenty-four instruments essential to fine brewing. These volumes marked the beginning of the worldwide diffusion of tea drinking.

Japan probably was the first country to import the tea drinking habit from China. As early as the 5th century, when Japanese monks were sent to China to learn Buddhism, they accepted tea as a part of their new "life style." But as was the case in China at that time, tea was regarded as a special beverage for use only by the holy occupation who took it as a medicine. Thus tea was not known to the public. Centuries passed and in the middle of the 13th century, a revolution took place. Eizai, a Japanese monk who brought Zen Buddhism from China to Japan, was summoned by the Shogun, who was suffering with a hangover. Eizai recommended strongly that the Shogun drink tea as a remedy. The Shogun greatly appreciated Eizai's prescription, and started drinking tea habitually. Encouraged by the event, Eizai wrote a book titled "Kissa Yōjō Ki" (Tea for Health); after that tea drinking became fashionable among the upper-class elites.

Because of the good climate for tea growing, the speed of diffusion of tea drinking in Japan was almost miraculous. By the end of the 14th century, even the poor peasants grew their own tea trees and were drinking tea.

The Arabs knew tea as a beverage in the 9th century. In central Asia, tea was brought from China during the Tang Dynasty (7th century); for the nomads of Tibet and Mongolia, tea was the most valuable source of Vitamin C, as they were unable to get green vegetables in the steppes of central Asia. As a matter of fact, the Chinese government during the Ming and Ching dynasties was able to manipulate these threatening "barbarians" by trading tea with them.

In comparison with the Asians, from Arabs to Japanese, westerners learned to appreciate tea much later.

The first record of tea in the West is found in the writings of Giambattista Ramusio, who found this new beverage called "Chai Catai" upon his visit to the Near East. In his volume, "Navigationi e Viaggi," published in 1559, he notes, "They take of that herb, whether dry or fresh, and boil it well in water. One or two cups of this decoction taken on an empty stomach removes fever, headache, stomach-ache, pain in the side or in joints, and it should be taken as hot as you can bear it."

Like their eastern counterparts, the Buddhist monks, the Jesuits also became very fond of tea as a substitute for alcohol. It is worthwhile to note that the 15th to 16th century was the period when Europe began to learn about Asia by way of the Arabs (indeed, the outer sea navigation know-how was brought by Arabs), and the "East-West Center" of that period existed in Baghdad. Tea was, in this sense, one of the earliest and the most important medium of intercultural communication; in Denys Forrest's phrasing it was "a regular East-West article of commerce."

The first tea export from China to Europe took place in 1606 in Bantam, Java where traders brought tea from China to be shipped to Holland by the Dutch East India Company.

Like all the new products and novelties, it took some time for tea to become popular in Europe. By the middle of the 17th century, however, tea was the most fashionable item in Paris. Racine, for instance, was a tea addict. But, of course, the people who showed the greatest enthusiasm for tea were the British. The first advertisement of tea (then called Tcha, Tay, or Tee) appeared in a British weekly magazine "Mercurius Politicus" in September 1658. The advertisement said that this new import from China was excellent and was approved by "all physicians"; that marked the beginning of the tea craze in that country. Especially after her colonial expansion to India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Great Britain became successful in establishing tea plantations, and London became the center of the tea trade from the turn of the 19th century on. As a matter of fact, in order to facilitate quick tea transportation from China to London, Britons built "tea clippers" and competed with each other in speed. According to the detailed investigation of "tea clippers" by David R. MacGregor, after the Napoleonic wars, ships with better sailing abilities were designed and built. The first of such new boats was the Scottish Maid, built in Aberdeen in 1839, followed by the Stornoway and other schooners.

Tea was thus a great spur to shipbuilders' technology, which continually advanced since that time. In 1885, a ship called the Eagle Wing succeeded in shortening her voyage time from Hong Kong to London to 83 days. This was a remarkable speed in comparison with the average of 120 days in the 1830s. The tea trade undoubtedly accelerated the incredible technological innovations of the mid-19th century. The races became a matter of British national pride, with Blue Ribbon Prizes being given to the fastest ships. What the tea clippers did in the 19th century can be compared to what NASA's space program did in the U.S.A. approximately one hundred years later. (Ironically enough, it should be added that the finest tea clippers were designed by Americans who had been prejudiced against tea since their famous rebellion against the British in 1773--the Boston Tea Party.)

Russians also became very fond of tea. The first export of tea from China to Russia can be traced back to the middle of the 17th century, but after the treaties of 1689 and 1727, the transport of tea by land began regularly. A caravan of 300 camels, each loaded with 600 pounds of tea, made a desperately slow 40 kilometers per day on the 16 months' journey from China to St. Petersburg. As in most of the countries in Europe, tea was first used only among aristocrats, but by the middle of the 19th century the Russian public were tea-lovers like the Britons, and the samovar (meaning "self service") had become a necessary part of Russian literature and drama.

In a word, the 19th century was the age in which the diffusion of the tea drinking habit extended all over the old continent. Even Americans, who pretended to be non-tea drinkers, were looking for tea by direct trade with China (by-passing London), and when the American Navy fleet came to Japan in 1853, they sought to buy tea from Japan. Indeed, the capital accumulation necessary for the modernization of Japan was made possible through her tea and silk trade with the United States.

With the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the Siberian Railroad (1891), the transport of tea from the East to the West was greatly eased. The people of the world, with almost no exception, came to use tea as a part of their everyday life before the end of the 19th century. According to the statistical data of the United Nations, the total production of tea in the 1950s was approximately 500,000 tons, and it increased to 740,000 tons in the 1960s. More than 90 percent of the production was, of course, in Asia, especially in India and Sri Lanka.

TEA AND SOCIABILITY

The most important function that tea has performed in the past several thousand years, especially the most recent few hundred years, was as a medium of interpersonal communication and it opened a new horizon in social interaction.

As was discussed earlier, the great Chinese scholars of ancient and medieval times enjoyed intellectual discourses over a cup of tea, and surely they never could have had such a leisurely exchange of ideas without tea. Dynasties changed one after another, and political systems have changed in China, but tea drinking as a cultural institution has not changed. As a matter of fact, tea is a necessary item in any social occasion in the People's Republic of China today. (A cup of tea was the proper beginning of such important diplomatic talks as the Kissinger-Mao meeting.)

Tea in Japan followed a similar development. After Eizai publicized the benefits of tea in the 13th century, it became a means of sociability among the elites.

Historical documents reveal that in the early 14th century, there were "tea parties" among the nobles, where they invited each other and with Buddhist ritual, served tea along with delicacies. The Japanese tea parties of the 14th century evolved into what is now known as the "tea ceremony" during the 15th century after Toyotomi Hideyoshi succeeded in unifying Japan and establishing his centralized government. Hideyoshi himself was very fond of inviting his subordinates to tea parties, and for the high-ranking samurai of the day, it was the greatest honor to be invited. Sen Soeki (more commonly known as Rikyū) came onto the scene at the tea parties of Hideyoshi. He developed philosophical justifications for tea and the tea party and established "Cha-dō" (The Way of Tea) as a discipline. He appraised the values of simplicity, quietness, and intimacy that the tea party created, and he also developed standard instructions for the proper manner for drinking tea and specified the appropriate accoutrements for the tea parties. Good tea cups became treasures; in an extreme case, a Daimyō (feudal lord) was glad to exchange his huge estate for a tea cup imported from China.

The most important social aspect of tea parties in Japan, however, was that they were instrumental in breaking the class lines of the feudal system. Rikyū strongly emphasized in his philosophy of tea that, regardless of one's social status, once he was in the "tea room" he was equal to everyone who shared tea in that room. The militant samurai, who carried their swords with them at all times, were asked to leave the weapons outside the tea room. The room had to be a sacred and clean place where people met without their secular attributes. A millionaire and a poor peasant, different in wealth and social status in their secular lives where they might never see each other, were as equals once they were in the same tea party. They were simply human beings sharing the same time and space in the tea room, and the tea

served on such occasions was the medium that connected all these persons with otherwise quite heterogeneous backgrounds.

Indeed, a small tea party in a small tea room was a good place for such a dominant figure as Hideyoshi to meet his subordinates informally and privately. In a "formal organization," a subordinate had the role of merely receiving orders from his master. Communication was heavily one-way. But in the tea room, by definition, there was no master-subordinate relationship. A subordinate was able to speak to his master as an equal human being, and the master had an opportunity to listen to his subordinates. It might be a secret meeting for administration; the "tea party" justified everything. In a word, a "tea party" was a great device to solve the communication problems of the feudal period.

As a matter of fact, Hideyoshi, who was very publicity-minded and knew the importance of public opinion, held an historically famous "great tea party" in 1595 where "...everybody, including youth, m[a]rchants, and farmers who are interested in tea, if he does have a cup ..." were invited. According to records, several hundred people joined the party, and Hideyoshi tried to converse with everybody. In this sense, a tea party had a liberating effect by providing "free" time and space in the rigidly structured feudal society.

The farmers too began holding tea parties to justify their secret meetings. The feudal lords of Japan were very cautious, for obvious reasons, of the possibility of agrarian revolts and petitions, and they prohibited the farmers from gathering at any time under any circumstances. But because the "tea party" had been so encouraged by Hideyoshi and other elites, even the farmers were permitted to invite each other for tea parties. Such parties were, naturally, a good excuse and disguise for conspiracy, and according to historical accounts, tea parties in rural Japan during the medieval period were hotbeds for agrarian revolt.

It is interesting and important to note that this "class-line breaking" effect that accompanied the growing popularity of tea in Japan also occurred in England, with the acceptance of coffee in the 17th century. In his book Tea and Coffee Edward Bramah examined the origin of coffee drinking in Britain:

> Oxford lays claim not only to being the place where coffee was first drunk in England but also to possessing the first English coffee house. The former claim is substantiated by a reference in Evelyn's diary of 1637, where we learn of its being taken by a member of Balliol College. The coffee house, which was called the Angel, was opened thirteen years later by a Lebanese named Jacob.

From that time, the "coffee house" became very popular among Britons, and hundreds of coffee houses were opened, especially in urban areas; these establishments assumed a new social function that had been unknown. "The coffee houses," J. M. Scott says, "where all classes met in an otherwise most class-conscious age, were ideal for conversation. Coffee and tea were both available, with pipes and tobacco to go with them. Clear brains were prompted to exchange ideas freely and on any subject."

At their peak, it is said that there were some 2,000 coffee houses in London alone, and people belonging to different social classes and with diversified backgrounds could meet and exchange ideas. Unlike his Japanese counterpart, Hideyoshi, who was in praise of tea parties, Charles II, the ruler of England, decided in 1675 to suppress coffee houses, because for him, these new establishments were "nurseries of idleness and pragmaticalness." But in spite of his efforts to oppress them, the establishments continued to exist and to flourish.

The situation grew worse for the conservatives (or for the most conservative) of England, because the public invented a more sophisticated institution--the "tea-garden"--an outdoor tea-drinking place. The tea-gardens with their flowered paths, and tables and chairs for tea service, were found mostly in the Chelsea and Bayswater suburbs of London. J. M. Scott describes the scene.

> The gardens were open from May to September. In the evenings they were gaily lighted with thousands of lanterns. There were concerts and fireworks displays. Tea-gardens catered for every stratum of society from royalty to the kitchen maid and her young man. As with coffee houses there was little or no class distinction here. Tea-gardens were not expensive. The inclusive charge was generally six pense or a shilling.

Clearly, the tea-garden broke not only the class-line but also the sex-line. For certain mysterious reasons, tea has been associated with the female; at least, there has been a firm belief that tea had to be poured by women, never by men. Even today, in English usage, the person who is in charge of pouring tea at a gathering is called the "Mother" although the party is exclusively for men. Because of this socio-psychological association of tea with things feminine, women were permitted to go to the tea-garden. Moreover, once in the tea-garden, a lady could take the initiative in approaching a man by asking "Will you treat me to a dish of tea?"

Tea-gardens in England (imitated by New Yorkers for a period of time), in this context, can be seen as a prototype of amusement parks, and at the same time, as one of the places where the emancipation of women began. Coffee houses and tea-gardens were places where people gathered and mixed freely across class, status, sex, age, and other social lines. They were, to exaggerate, the "liberated sections" of modern urban life in western Europe, where people could talk with each other and express themselves at their liberty. Indeed, the whole French Revolution started in 1789 as an outgrowth of café society. Considering the role of tea in the American Revolution of the 1770s, it is safe to say that tea was responsible for two major revolutions of the 18th century.

Feudal Japan in the 18th century was less developed and less liberated, but as in London and Paris, "tea houses" were very prosperous. At this time the metaphysics of the "Way of Tea" was still appreciated by elites, but the common people preferred not to be bothered by the complicated rituals, and they looked upon tea as a casual and social drink. An incredible number of Cha-ya (tea houses) were established after the middle of the 18th century. According to tax revenue

records (each establishment had to pay a fixed annual rate of tax), there were about 20,000 tea houses in the old city of Edo (Tokyo) and its environs. The population of the city at that period is estimated at approximately two million, and the number of tea houses implies that there was a tea house for every 100 people. An essayist of the time said "at tea houses, hot water is boiling in a kettle all the time, and when you enter, you are served a cup of tea. The tea houses are under the management of ladies, and the ladies compete their beauty to attract more patrons, and patrons emulated each other to attract more attention from their favorite hostesses." The size of the tea house varied from a very small one that could accommodate only two or three people to an establishment that could serve 50 people. The smaller ones were "portable," that is, the whole shop could be folded into a package so that the owner could move to another place (a forerunner of mobile ice cream vendors). The larger ones were permanent buildings, and the owner-hostesses of such reputable tea houses not only made a huge amount of money but also were listed in a "catalogue of beauties"; the woodblock prints of these ladies were sold to the public. It is safe to say that the hostesses of 18th century Japan were the forerunners of the beauty contestants of the 20th century.

An important parallel should be noted here. As was discussed earlier, tea has been associated with things feminine (if not feminism) in England, and in Japan, too, tea in the public tea houses had to be served by women. Furthermore, it is quite probable that the "tea house" was the first business institution in Japan that women were permitted to own and run. Here again, tea had a liberating effect on sex discrimination.

The tea houses in Japan were a multi-purpose communication media. "Regulars" could leave messages for their friends with the hostess; young people could assemble at their favorite tea house for casual conversation; retired people could spend hours at their leisure. Moreover, the philosophy of "The Way of Tea" in its secularized version existed, and the people belonging to different social classes met at the tea house for appointments. This aspect was extremely important because the samurai class of the 18th century were not warriors any more, and they often had to be good bureaucrats, able to make transactions and contracts with the merchant class. For business negotiation, the offices of both samurai and merchant were inappropriate; a status distinction was clearly defined therein. But in the tea house, where the atmosphere was informal, a samurai could meet and conduct business with a merchant as an equal and vice versa. In other words, the tea house was the place where the "strip tease of status" was possible and desirable.

The discovery of the socio-cultural convenience of the tea house accelerated the evolution of the establishment. Because the tea house was the ideal meeting place for everybody, it lacked privacy. Consequently, for the purpose of business negotiation, the merchants began to seek a separate room in the tea house; such a demand perpetrated a new type of tea house--one with several separate rooms for privacy. The name of "tea house" was retained, but functionally, this new type of tea house was quite different. At the request of the patrons, alcohol and food were served, thus "tea house" evolved to a restaurant. The prototype of Japanese sociability in the past two hundred years can be found in this new institution, and even today, it is customary for Japanese business executives to use "tea houses" (still called Cha-ya) for their "informally formal" business talks.

As easily can be imagined, the "tea houses" also served as a place for dating. A young couple could get together at a tea house; there were striking similarities in social function with the tea-gardens of England. Tea, in a word, was the medium of liberation and social relaxation in many ways in the East and in the West.

SOCIO-CULTURAL FUNCTIONS OF STIMULANTS

Tea became a medium of social interaction for several noteworthy reasons. In the beginning, in both East and West, tea was used by the people belonging to holy occupations as a substitute for alcohol. Of course, tea is much milder in comparison, but the caffeine and tannin contained in tea were stimulating enough to keep a person awake.

Physiologically speaking, tea is a stimulant that comfortably refreshes and excites the brain. Or, to exaggerate, tea can change the "ordinary" state of mind to something special, as most other "stimulants" do.

Alcohol is an extreme example of a substance that alters the ordinary state. When a certain amount of alcohol is taken in both physiological and psychological changes take place. The heart beat becomes faster, physical movements get slower, mental judgment becomes obscure, the brain is stirred up; the more a person drinks, the more he becomes "intoxicated." An alcoholic sees strange visions and images, and he loses his "ordinary" intellect and judgment. We know that people become more talkative and more cheerful when they drink a certain amount of scotch or gin or whatever. Indeed, an individual often appears as a different "persona" (if not personality) when he is intoxicated.

As may be true in many other cultures, the ancient Japanese regarded alcohol as something "sacred" and a person who acquired a different "persona" as the result of drinking alcohol was thought to be under the special influence caused by the "magical" power attributed to alcohol. They thought that the person with that special "persona" was temporarily the medium of messages transmitted from the gods to human beings. In a word, a person who was under the influence of alcohol was a shaman, and therefore the use of alcohol was, initially, limited only to shamans. Alcohol was a necessary raw-material by which a shaman could be a medium between the "sacred" and the "profane" world, to use the Durkheim-Eliade dichotomy.

It may be worthwhile, at this point, to look at the origin and diffusion of tobacco, another stimulant whose cultural and religious function was originally very similar to that of alcohol. It has been said that it was Columbus who "discovered" tobacco, but the honor of the first discovery must be attributed to the people of ancient Maya. Like many other societies, in Maya, the dominant holy figure was the Sun, and in its Sun-cult both fire and smoke were associated with the sacred sun. The monks of this isolated great civilization discovered tobacco as a medium of communication between the Sun-god and the people of the Empire. They dried tobacco leaves and made smoke on the altar; after inhaling the smoke, they exhaled it toward the Sun and toward the four holy directions--North, South, East, and West.

They believed that the spirit of fire was contained in the holy smoke, and that this inhaling and exhaling of smoke was a process of communication with the "Sacred" world. In his voluminous book Shamanism, Eliade suggests that the smoke of Maya had essentially a shamanistic effect. Like alcohol, tobacco stimulates the nervous system, and by inhaling the smoke, a smoker experiences a certain physio-nervous excitement that creates a state of mind different from the "ordinary" experience.

The minimum requirement for becoming a shaman is to be obsessed by something and to become a different "self"; to achieve that "transformation," there are several means. According to comparative shamanism dancing is one of the most popular means to be detached from the "ordinary" world; the practice of shamanistic dancing is found among American Indians, tribes in Siberia, Korea, Japan, and many other Mongoloid cultures. Drinking alcohol and inhaling tobacco smoke also were means to achieve the same goal. By taking such stimulants, a person can easily be under a different "persona." Ancient Maya can be seen as the place where tobacco used as a shamanistic medium was initiated.

The monks of Maya used the holy smoke of tobacco as a medicine, and the smoke was sprayed over the body of the sick. Today, in many cultures in Asia, including Japan, it is believed that the holy smoke of incense on the altar of certain Buddhist temples can cure almost all illness. In the center of Tokyo, in such a popular temple as Sensoji, hundreds of people come daily to take the smoke of incense by palm and rub it on the painful areas of their body.

The mysterious Empire of Maya disappeared in an earthquake in the middle of the 7th century, but the smoking habit had been transmitted to the Aztec. When the Aztec civilization came to its peak in the 15th century, it had built the Kingdom of Montezuma with pyramids for the worship of the Sun-god. To express their gratitude to the Sun-god, the Aztecs burned tobacco leaves continuously at their shrines, and the smoking of tobacco in thin pipes was practiced by the general public before the 15th century. Tobacco smoking was known not only to the Aztecs, but also was apparent in most parts of the American continent; in the middle of the 15th century, the tobacco smoking habit was transmitted to greater North America as far as to the tribes along the St. Lawrence River.

One important aspect of tobacco smoking was related to sociability. Native North Americans exchanged a puff of pipe tobacco as a token of friendship (as we know from John Wayne movies), and sharing the same pipe of tobacco became a symbol of social intimacy in many cultures, including the Japanese. In many countries, until the cancer warning came in the early 1960s, it was customary among gentlemen to offer a cigar or cigarette at the beginning of all social occasions. With a puff of smoke a conversation began.

The first non-American tobacco smokers were the sailors who landed on the new continent with Columbus. But when they carried tobacco seeds back home, tobacco was appreciated as an exotic plant rather than as a smoking material. It was in Lisbon in the middle of the 16th century that tobacco smoking started. In 1561, tobacco came to be recognized by the holy stratum of European societies when the seeds were accepted by the Pope as a medicine.

Tobacco was taken to France in 1559 by Jean Nico, the French ambassador to Lisbon, (the name "nicotine" came from Nico's name), and the leaves of the new plant were first used in the French Royal family as a remedy for headache. As the smoking habit spread to the French public, Luis XIII saw a great potential tax revenue from the sale of tobacco. The rebels of the 18th century, who gathered at the Cafe for the political intrigue that led to the French Revolution, were smokers; their first act after the Revolution of 1789 was to eliminate the monopoly sales of tobacco and to abolish the hated tobacco tax. Here again is significant relationship between stimulants and socio-cultural revolution.

The point however, is the historical fact that, like alcohol, tobacco also has been considered a special material that could transform a person's "ordinary" self into a different self. And as was discussed relative to tea, both alcohol and tobacco were associated originally with, and monopolized by, the people of the holy occupation--shamans, priests, monks, and bishops. The "stimulants" were the materials by which the holy occupation could justify their special status, as the "stimulants" could make them "different."

The "self-transformation" effects of "stimulants" continued even after the use of such materials was "secularized." A good example is the use of alcohol in Japan.

The use of alcohol ceased to be under the monopoly of shamans, and became diffused among the public in a very early period, but yet, as far as Japan is concerned, until the beginning of the 20th century, people did not drink alcohol except for special occasions, such as festivals and ceremonies. Moreover, alcohol drinking was limited to the late evenings which were regarded as the "holy hours." (Indeed, even today, one of the culture shocks that Japanese visitors to the western cultures usually experience is the fact that in the United States and in Europe, people start drinking during the day.)

According to the writings of Kunio Yanagita, founder of Japanese folklore studies, it was only one hundred years ago that drinking Sake became a part of everyday life. Furthermore, the Japanese people today regard a person's "self" when drinking alcohol (or drunk) as different from his "self" of ordinary circumstances. It is for this reason that the Japanese are, more or less, permissive with each other for conduct while drinking that would otherwise be inexcusable. It often happens in Japan, for instance, at a banquet, that a lower-ranking employee may tease or even insult his (or her, but usually his) boss in intolerable words, but nobody cares what he says simply because he is intoxicated. Next morning, the man may go to see his superior and apologize for his speech, but the boss usually says "never mind, that was an affair with Sake."

In other words, the level, or even the quality of social tolerance can be changed with the aid of alcohol. The world where people share alcohol is different from the ordinary world. The organization, moral structure, ethics, and the whole value system is transformed. An "ordinary person" cannot blame a person under the influence of alcohol. From the viewpoint of social engineering, a banquet in Japan is a safety valve by which formal organizational frustrations can be released.

Though the situation is not that extreme, many societies, including the "country of Freedom," the United States, share a certain social view of alcohol. At least, the level of tolerance at cocktail parties (especially "wild" ones) is

usually much higher than in "ordinary" institutionalized situations.

SELF WITH MANY FACES

One of the contributions of Japanese folklore to the other disciplines of social science and the humanities may be the dichotomy of Hare and Ke. Hare means "special occasions" and Ke means "everyday life." It may seem to be another version of the "sacred" and "profane" dichotomy of which French sociologists are very fond, but Hare is not necessarily "sacred." It includes, of course, "sacred," but in the usage of Japanese folklore, Hare can include more things and events. For example, a travel, a vacation, a party, going out for shopping, and many other areas and behaviors that do not belong to "everyday life" are called Hare. It simply means "special (non-everyday) life occasions." As the "sacred" and "profane" dichotomy, in spite of its seemingly clear definition, is often ambiguous, the discussion of this paper so far may fit more into a Hare and Ke dichotomy as a part of Japanese enthnomethodology.

On Hare occasions, one observable characteristic is the change in peoples' clothing. When people travel, they usually pick up better clothes. On vacation, they may feel happier and take more informal outfits. These are not "sacred" occasions, but "different" occasions, and as the token of being "different" people wear the costume which they do not wear in Ke or "everyday life" situations.

In Hawaii, every Friday is "Aloha Friday," and people are expected to be in Hawaiian attire. At least, Aloha shirts or muumuus are permissible and encouraged in the office where more formal dressing is required on other weekdays. From the viewpoint of Japanese folklore, apparently "Aloha Friday" is a Hare occasion. Hare is a change or detachment from everyday life, or Ke.

In contrast to, and often complementary to, the changes in clothing on Hare occasions, the "stimulants" (tobacco, alcohol, coffee, tea, etc., if not "drugs") are the means by which a person can change his inner "self." Many of us can share many experiences of this sort. In a formal organization, a business executive wears grey flannel suits (not in Hawaii, of course) and he works diligently at his desk. It is a Ke situation--a very ordinary, usual, and routine business day. But over the weekend, when he "changes" from business suit to sports jacket and takes some scotch, he experiences a "different" self. His external look is different and his internal self-image is different with the aid of stimulants. Thus, a Hare experience is completed. A person has become different from his ordinary "self."

It may be worthwhile, in this context, to refer to one of the most obsolete yet most popular themes of Science Fiction--the metamorphosis of "self." In its most popular version, we have childrens' naive TV programs such as "Kikaida" (made in Japan) in which the hero, usually a common and ordinary fellow, changes himself, at a critical moment, into a super-human creature with the aid of a magical ritual. The prototype of this genre, of course, was "Superman," in daily life, was Clark Kent, mild-mannered newspaper reporter. But when something beyond human control occurs, such as a boy hanging from the top of a skyscraper (no explanation given as to how he got there), this ordinary reporter, after a few minutes' black-box process in his bathroom, becomes Superman--"able to leap tall buildings in a single bound, more powerful than a locomotive, and faster than a speeding bullet." He comes out with a strange costume that was conspicuously recognizable. "Kikaida" and others are variations of "Superman."

The psychological implications of "Superman" and others, however, are serious, because there seems to be within each of us an inherent need or desire to change one's self. Even those intellectuals who despise "Superman" as a cheap, vulgar product of commercialism cannot resist the theme of Franz Kafka's "Metamorphosis." As far as their basic philosophy is concerned, the distance between Kafka and "Superman" is not too great. All of us want to change and to see and experience our different "self" or "selves."

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the history of the philosophy of "self" from G. H. Mead to Irving Goffman, but as A. Strauss brilliantly discussed in his book Mirrors and Masks, a person is multi-faced. The same person appears wearing different masks (or "personas") under different circumstances. And if one looks into social interaction and sociability, we must admit that some "change," both external and internal, takes place on many occasions. The problem of the multi-faced-ness of our being brings up another obsolete question, that of "identity crisis"; it should be stressed here that, quite contrary to the common assumption that the "crisis" is a product of an over-organized society, people have a true desire to change and to have several self-images. Sociability is an interaction among masked people (in its extreme, we have masquerade!) and masks may have positive value as well as negative. One may appreciate the diversity of one's "selves" and by doing so, may find new alternatives and possibilities.

Indeed, the ideal of Karl Marx was, as he wrote in The Critic of Political Economy, the social condition where "the same individual can be a farmer in the morning, a fisherman in the afternoon, and a poet in the evening." Does this communist ideal involve "identity crisis"? The brighter side of "identity crisis" may be connected with the concept and ideal of "whole man," another German philosophical tradition. Probably, "stimulants" are the medium by which people can change and appear under different masks to enjoy social interaction.

It is probably for this reason that the repeating toast of Vodka is a necessary part in establishing a Hare occasion in the Soviet Union, a cocktail party in the United States, Kava among Pacific Islanders, and tea in China and Japan.

GILDED EXPECTATIONS

—An Aspect of Intercultural Communication—*

For the purpose of mental exercise and entertainment, think of the name of a country--any country, close your eyes, and see what happens in your mind. You will probably get a clear mental image of your particular country. These images are usually very standardized. If you were thinking about India, you may have "seen" the Taj Mahal, or Gandhi, or New Delhi, or Calcutta. If you were thinking about Spain, the image of a bullfight or a flamenco guitar may have emerged. If you take Tanganyika, wild animals and African tribal people appear. If you were thinking of Japan, probably, you saw Mt. Fuji, many shrines, temples, and young Japanese ladies in Kimonos. What I am speaking about is not a new idea at all. Needless to say, this is what Walter Lippmann has labeled as "the world inside our heads," and what social-psychologist Gordon Allport has termed "stereotypes." It is a kind of social shorthand, and everyone of us is skilled in this technique of recording our perceptions. We perceive the world around us through these shorthand techniques, and in our minds we establish an "instant" world of fragmented images, and stereotypes. The world inside our heads is quite different from the world outside of our heads. The image is one thing and the reality is quite another. One of the greatest semanticists, Professor S.I. Hayakawa, refers to the relationship between image and reality with an analogy of a map and a territory. There is the physical existence of the Island of Oahu (territory), and to move around the landscape, we have a driving map. There is a correspondence between map and territory, but the important thing is that a map is not a territory. Now, think about the State of Hawaii. There are approximately one million tourists every year from both sides of the Pacific. According to the Hawaii Visitors Bureau, 50 percent are from the mainland USA and another 50 percent are from Japan. These tourists come to Hawaii with a standardized and stereotypic image. Most of these people associate the name of Hawaii with the hula dance, Waikiki Beach, and Diamond Head, and they enjoy that expectation or image before they ever arrive in Waikiki. But in reality what do they find on the beach of Waikiki or in the city of Honolulu? I may be exaggerating a little, but whenever I go down to Waikiki these days, it seems like rush-hour in the New York subways (though they are admittedly better than rush-hours in Tokyo). Those tourists who have been looking for lovely hula girls will find practically no "nativistic" entertainment in the local night clubs. Though my observation time has been very short, Waikiki seems to me to be another Disneyland--this is a special segment of the city. If they stepped outside of Waikiki, these tourists would find quite different realities, through many problems which we know very well through newspaper and television everyday. Expectations about Waikiki are one thing and the reality of Hawaii is quite another thing. This is one of the characteristics of our age: image and reality do not have much relationship. Image has its autonomous world, quite separated from what is going on in reality. This why I have selected "Gilded Expectations" as the title of my speech tonight. Visitors to Hawaii usually come with "gilded expectations" and people heading for Japan have the same kind of "gilded expectations" about it. Of course, historically speaking, I think we should see the positive value of such gilding. In the 13th century when Marco Polo made his first journey to China across the continent, he wrote a book in which he introduced what were essentially gilded expectations of the Orient. This was the first geography book and described Japan under the name Zipangu--Zipangu, according to Marco Polo, was thought to be a country literally made of gold. According to him, every house in Japan was made of gold. And it was these gilded rumors begun by Marco Polo which attracted many explorers from the West to the Orient, and Columbus was no exception. It was gilded expectations about a new continent--known as the USA today--which brought millions of immigrants from Europe and from Asia. And gilded expectations brought people from the East Coast of the United States to the West Coast when the cry of "gold" sounded in California. We can see that in the past as well as in the present gilded expectations motivated people to move around, to discover new things, and to accomplish new achievements. As I mentioned, most visitors to Hawaii come with gilded expectations; the problem is, how did they acquire these ideas? We can speak of "them," but at the same time we should think about "us"--everybody has a version of a personalized, instant world of gilded expectations and standardized images. How did we gain our expectations about unfamiliar places? I would like to suggest that the mass media are partly responsible for the gilded expectations. Especially, with the development of audiovisual technology in communication--radio, movies, and TV--we have begun to receive clear, on-the-spot images. Before the invention of movies, the only medium was the written word. With movies vivid and realistic pictures of each country were introduced. I conducted a small survey in Japan several years ago on the images of major foreign countries, by asking youngsters what they associate with the names of certain cities. My finding was very interesting; when, for example, Rome was mentioned, up to 75 percent of the youngsters associated their images of Rome with the popular movie "Roman Holiday." They immediately associated Rome with Audrey Hepburn, and many youngsters imitated everything that was presented in that movie. Miss Hepburn's haircut, her costume, and even her shoes became popular among the Japanese teenagers. Images of Hong Kong were attributed to another very nice Hollywood production, "The World of Susie Wong," and adults as well as teenagers easily associated Hong Kong with that romantic movie. Hawaii in the past has been the setting

for Elvis Presley in "Blue Hawaii," and television's "Hawaii Five-O"; all these movies and TV programs created a gilded image of Hawaii. This kind of romantic expectation about major cities as well as nations was created and fabricated either intentionally or unintentionally, either consciously or unconsciously, by the movie producers. Not only do we have movies and TV programs, but also brochures, pamphlets, leaflets, travel guides, posters, which you can obtain free at any travel agent's desk, all designed to perpetuate the gilded images and stimulate business. The more I think about this increase in gilded expectations, the more I am inclined to think that they are perhaps the most promising and the most fashionable merchandise in contemporary society. Gilded expectations are a major marketing item, not only in the tourist industry but also in most of the other industries. For example, take the automobile! We buy automobiles because, we say, we need them. Of course, in American society you need automobiles to move around, but are we really buying automobiles because of their function? In my opinion, the functional definition of an automobile as a vehicle to carry people from one point to another efficiently and speedily is the minimum definition of a complex of steel, rubber, and other materials. But are we really looking for function--for the practical value--in an automobile? Maybe some jeep-owners are buying function, but for most of the automobile consumers it is not merely a machine, not simply physical hardware. They are buying style, comfort, design, texture, and color. In other words, we are buying an expectation and an image rather than an automobile as a machine. Twenty years ago, an American anthropologist, Dr. Powdermaker, wrote a fascinating book, Hollywood--A Dream-factory. Before she wrote the book, she spent some years on one of the Pacific islands doing an anthropological study. Upon her return, she studied the tribal-social organization of Hollywood, and in Hollywood--A Dream-factory she tried to distinguish the movie industry from other industries. Today I think of Detroit as a dream factory. The automobile manufacturers are producing gilded expectations about their products. You can choose any consumer commodity that you see in TV commercials. For example, any shampoo, dishwashing detergent, soap, or toothpaste--I've been watching TV and it's quite fascinating to note the ways these commodities are presented. Are we really buying shampoo? Not necessarily--not always. Many of the consumers are buying expectations about shampoo, but not the shampoo itself. According to the commercials, if you use a certain shampoo, your hair will be soft and pretty--that's what the commercial says. Consumers do not buy the shampoo as a chemical compound for cleaning their hair. Indeed, we are surrounded by the salesmen of images and expectations. Or perhaps our contemporary society is in itself a supermarket of gilded expectations. Especially in a country like the United States where material affluence has been achieved, images are probably the most promising and the only consumer commodity--an invisible commodity. We are the consumers of expectations and images. We buy the image of an automobile rather than the automobile; we buy the image and expectation of shampoo rather than the shampoo.

The same is true with international communication. The images of countries today are something to be "sold" and consumed. This is a very important aspect of international communication. The more the expectations are gilded the higher their market price. Some countries are very successful in manufacturing appealing images of themselves, thus attracting more people both in industry and trade as well as in the tourist business. One of the very important and interesting developments in the past two decades is the upsurge of countries today that are interested in publicizing their images and in trying to formulate a "marketable" image. This is part of the international publicity activity of the foreign ministry of any country. If you convey a better image of your particular country, you can expect a more favorable response from the outside world. What is known as "image building" is decisively important in contemporary diplomacy. One example, noted by Jerry Burris of the Honolulu Advertiser, is the Japanese problem of an image gap. His point was that Japan is suffering from the bad image of the Japanese nation, and many people are worried about this. They are seeking to improve the Japanese image in foreign markets. Today, I learned again through the Honolulu Advertiser that Mr. Simpson of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau gave a speech yesterday, saying that the expectations and images of Hawaii are in danger. He said, if my memory is correct, that the image of Hawaii as a warm and friendly island declined 4 percent among tourists in 1972 after they had seen Waikiki. Everybody is concerned about image. The executives of manufacturing companies are concerned about corporate image and product image. We have many experts who produce gilded expectations. One reason the City of Honolulu can attract one million people every year is that it is very successful in implanting a gilded expectation abroad. The City of Kyoto from where I come, has ten million tourists every year because we have very smart people producing its images. To the tourist business and consumer markets, if their marketing of image is successful, I would say congratulations! But at the same time I see an irony in this process. Generally speaking, we have the assumption that if we have more communication and exchange of information we can have a better understanding. I think this is a very fundamental and widely-shared assumption. It is quite true that the amount of communication has increased dramatically in the past 20-30 years. People have become more literate than ever before. But do we really understand each other better than our ancestors did? We receive a considerable amount of information everyday. This is especially true in the United States where a locality may be served by thick, daily morning and evening newspapers, several channels of television, and more than ten radio stations. There is available information about anything. I am afraid we are getting the same information but in huge doses. This is in contrast to what happened in the nineteenth century. Then and at the turn of the century, the basic problem of social communication, both in the West and the East, was an uninformed public. There were many illiterate people; there were many poor people who could not afford to buy newspapers. The politicians as well as communicators and educators were very concerned about providing adequate information. The uninformed public has now disappeared in the United States, Japan, and most of the European countries. We have many media of communication which you can use for free or for a nominal price. In contrast to the uninformed public of the nineteenth century, today we have an over-informed public that at the same time is very often a mis-informed public. The media can report some aspects of what is happening, and disregard the rest. As I said, the symbolic activity of the human

being is a map of the territory we know as reality. If we have a very good map—an accurate map--it can be a good guide for our "travel" in life. But not all the maps are accurate. We are all familiar with the distorted maps produced by commercial firms. I was recently handed a small map advertising a small restaurant in Honolulu, and according to the map, the "small" restaurant was a huge building occupying an entire street-corner. In order to attract customers, they provide a distorted map. However, one cannot travel with this kind of map. I am afraid that the instant world of our minds is a map which is not completely accurate. What has aggravated the situation in the past ten years is, what I might call, the expectations about expectations. This is a very, very complicated business in intercultural communication. Everybody knows that if Japan is symbolized only by Mt. Fuji and geisha-girls, this is a stereotypic, standardized, and distorted picture. Everyone is aware of that. I met with an editor who was publishing an international publicity magazine for an improved image of Japan abroad. On the first page of his magazine I found the mask of a Noh play and on the second page, Shinto shrines and geisha-girls--all stereotypic pictures. So I asked him, "Why don't you edit this kind of picture? We have many more things to be communicated to the readers abroad." He was embarrassed and told me that he thought that foreigners would expect this kind of thing in Japan. This is what I call the "barbershop effect." You sit in a barbershop chair and you have mirrors on both sides that show endless reflections. In the case of the publisher he anticipated the readers' expectations and tried to meet them. A few years ago, again in Japan, we had an "Exhibition of Misunderstood Japan." This was an exhibit of school textbooks collected from the United States, Europe, and Asia, etc. The Minister of Education of our people collected hundreds of these textbooks in which Japan and the image of Japan were quite distorted. In some textbooks Japan was even confused with China; in others pictures taken in the 1920's were used for a 1965 edition. Japan was described as essentially an agricultural country, and Mt. Fuji and all the other stereotypic pictures appeared. The Japanese public was upset because of this distortion and misunderstanding; I was also very much concerned about this exhibit, and I asked at least five editors of overseas textbook companies, "How did you get your idea of Japan?" They answered that they got their information from the official publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Government. Ironically, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is interested in publicizing the beauty of tradition in Japan, they included visual pictures, and attractive catch-phrases in these leaflets and distributed them through Japanese embassies to educators, including textbook editors. We cannot blame the editors for their ignorance, because their ignorance came from Japan, not of the past but of the present. This is another outcome of this "barbershop effect." Very often I think misunderstanding is much worse than simple ignorance. I could illustrate this point endlessly, but I think it would be better to conclude.

We have the problem of distortions in intercultural communication—despite the increasing amount of information exchanged. What can we do about it? I have been asking this question of my colleagues both in Japan and the United States for the past 2-3 years, and many experts have offered many expert opinions and suggestions. Some suggest that more international education curriculum is the answer. I think this is quite correct because the children of the world should become aware of other countries and ways of life when they are very young. In our social-studies curriculum we need more international materials. Another sociologist has said that reading should be emphasized more than viewing. I think that is also a very good suggestion because in audio-visual communication you digest instantaneous images while when reading you must call upon your own imagination. So more reading is necessary. A third expert has said that more serious studies of images should be done. I think that is also a very good point. In the 1950's people at MIT, especially Professor Harold Issacs, did an excellent job in image studies. More image studies should be encouraged. Another person said that young people should have more opportunities for intercultural contacts--international seminars and exchange of persons and students--that's a marvelous idea. These things are necessary, but in addition to these fine suggestions, I would like to make another suggestion. Though it may sound rather strange, I think we need more confusion. We should be exposed to more diversified, more contradictory, more conflicting pictures about the countries of the world instead of having a non-contradictory, single picture of a country. For instance, if we read newspapers or magazines about Japan carefully and learn from her people, we have at least 5 or 10 really contradictory pictures of Japan. To reiterate, we have the prevalent and standardized picture of Japan as symbolized by temples, Mt. Fuji, and geisha. A second picture of Japan emerges of transistor radios, motorcycles, tape recorders, TV, etc. In a third picture socialists and communists are becoming more visible. In recent mayoral elections five out of the six major cities in Japan seated mayors supported by either the Socialist or the Communist Party. However, it should be noted that the factory workers who have been demonstrating and supporting socialist and communist mayors are the same young people who are coming to Hawaii for vacation. These workers enjoy life with color TVs, automobiles, and other durable goods. That conjures another contradictory picture. The same students who participated in campus demonstrations had bottles of Coca Cola in their hands while demonstrating outside the American Embassy in Tokyo. And their favorite music is rock. They sing labor songs as well as American folksongs. Another picture of Japan would emphasize economic boom, real estate, high productivity, and GNP, but at the same time Japan has a dreadful pollution problem. Pictures of the United States are equally contradictory. Recently, the newspapers have carried full reports on the Watergate scandal. At the same time Chinese reporters visited Hawaii, the Space Lab is up in the sky, gasoline is in lowered supply, crime is increasing, and decent middle class American culture is here to stay.

To my mind, a culture is an aggregate of divergent and contradictory pictures, and each picture is true.

I am reminded of a "multi-screen" exhibit at Expo '70 in Japan, a production in which I participated. The exhibit consisted of approximately 300 pictures projected on the ceiling and the surrounding wall of a huge dome. A picture of a happy young couple was shown next to a picture of an old beggar; starving people in Africa appeared side by side with a picture of beach resorts in southern France; a luxurious fashion show was shown next to a

picture of the Vietnam War. The exhibit was designed in such a way that the audience could be, and should be, exposed to 300 different, contrasting, and conflicting images of the world. It was a strange and uneasy experience for every person who saw it. Many people complained that these pictures almost drove them crazy. But our basic philosophy in the production of this exhibit was that the world is contradictory and diverse. As it reflected this, the exhibit was a success.

Of the 300 different pictures, we cannot tell which ones are true and which ones are false. All the pictures are true however, they may look incompatible, contradictory, strange, and funny. My thesis is that we need this kind of confusion in our perception of the world. We should be ready to accept a pluralistic world of truths. The gilded images of the world, of course, are much more attractive than confusion, but confusion leads us to more serious thinking, and it is from such thinking that better understanding of other peoples of the world derives.

When we were children, most of us enjoyed looking into kaleidoscopes and were fascinated by the changing shapes and colors of such a small magic box. If we can retain a part of the curiosity of our childhood, if we can recover our child likeness, I am sure that all of us will find a fascinating world in the multi-screen images.

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